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The greater power of bad events over good ones is found in everyday events, major life
events (e.g., trauma), close relationship outcomes, social network patterns, interper-
sonal interactions, and learning processes. Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback
have more impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly
than good. The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good
ones. Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to
disconfirmation than good ones. Various explanations such as diagnosticity and sa-
lience help explain some findings, but the greater power of bad events is still found
when such variables are controlled. Hardly any exceptions (indicating greater power of
good) can be found. Taken together, these findings suggest that bad is stronger than
good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena.
Centuries of literary efforts and religious
thought have depicted human life in terms of a
struggle between good and bad forces. At the
metaphysical level, evil gods or devils are the
opponents of the divine forces of creation and
harmony. At the individual level, temptation
and destructive instincts battle against strivings
for virtue, altruism, and fulfillment. "Good" and
"bad" are among the first words and concepts
learned by children (and even by house pets),
and most people can readily characterize almost
any experience, emotion, or outcome as good or
bad.
What form does this eternal conflict take in
psychology? The purpose of this article is to
review evidence pertaining to the general hy-
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pothesis that bad is stronger than good (see also
Rozin & Royzman, in press). That is, events
that are negatively valenced (e.g., losing
money, being abandoned by friends, and receiv-
ing criticism) will have a greater impact on the
individual than positively valenced events of
the same type (e.g., winning money, gaining
friends, and receiving praise). This is not to say
that bad will always triumph over good, spelling
doom and misery for the human race. Rather,
good may prevail over bad by superior force of
numbers: Many good events can overcome the
psychological effects of a single bad one. When
equal measures of good and bad are present,
however, the psychological effects of bad ones
outweigh those of the good ones. This may in
fact be a general principle or law of psycholog-
ical phenomena, possibly reflecting the innate
predispositions of the psyche or at least reflect-
ing the almost inevitable adaptation of each
individual to the exigencies of daily life.
This pattern has already been recognized in
certain research domains. This is probably most
true in the field of impression formation, in
which the positive-negative asymmetry effect
has been repeatedly confirmed (e.g., Anderson,
1965; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Skowronski
& Carlston, 1989). In general, and apart from a
few carefully crafted exceptions, negative infor-
mation receives more processing and contrib-
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utes more strongly to the final impression than
does positive information. Learning something
bad about a new acquaintance carries more
weight than learning something good, by and
large.
In other spheres, the effect seems present but
not recognized. For example, nearly every psy-
chology textbook teaches that propinquity
breeds attraction. This conclusion is based on
the landmark study by Festinger, Schachter, and
Back (1950) in which the formation of friend-
ships in a married students' dormitory was
tracked over time. Contrary to elaborate hypoth-
eses about similarity, role complementarity,
values, and other factors, the strongest predictor
of who became friends was physical propin-
quity: Participants who lived closest to each
other were most likely to become friends.
Yet a lesser known follow-up by Ebbesen,
Kjos, and Konecni (1976) found that propin-
quity predicted the formation of disliking even
more strongly than liking. Living near one an-
other increased the likelihood that two people
would become enemies even more strongly than
it predicted the likelihood that they would be-
come friends. Propinquity thus does not cause
liking. More probably, it simply amplifies the
effect of other variables and events. Because
bad events are stronger than good ones, an
identical increase in propinquity produces more
enemies than friends.
The relative strength of bad may also be
relevant to the topics studied by research psy-
chologists. As president of the American Psy-
chological Association, Martin Seligman (1999)
called for a "positive psychology" movement to
offset the negative focus that he saw as domi-
nating most of psychology's history. The nega-
tive focus was first documented by Carlson's
(1966) survey of psychology textbooks, in
which he found twice as many chapters (121 vs.
52) devoted to unpleasant as to pleasant emo-
tions, and a similar imbalance was found in
lines of coverage and use of specific words.
More recently, Czapinski (1985) coded more
than 17,000 research articles in psychology
journals and found that the coverage of negative
issues and phenomena exceeded positive, good
ones 69% to 31%, a bias that was fairly strong
across all areas of psychology (although weak-
est in social psychology). Seligman is probably
quite right in proposing that psychologists have
focused most of their theoretical and empirical
efforts on understanding the bad rather than the
good.
Why has this been so? Undoubtedly, one
hypothesis might be that psychologists are pes-
simistic misanthropes or sadists who derive per-
verse satisfaction from studying human suffer-
ing and failure. An alternative explanation,
however, would be that psychology has con-
sisted of young researchers trying to obtain pub-
lishable findings in a relatively new science that
was characterized by weak measures and high
variance. They needed to study the strongest
possible effects in order for the truth to shine
through the gloom of error variance and to
register on their measures. If bad is stronger
than good, then early psychologists would in-
evitably gravitate toward studying the negative
and troubled side of human life, whereas the
more positive phenomena had to wait until the
recent emergence of stronger methods, more
sensitive measures, and better statistical
techniques.
The goal of this review is to draw together the
asymmetrical effects of bad and good across a
deliberately broad range of phenomena. Even in
topic areas in which this asymmetry has been
recognized (as in impression formation), re-
searchers have not generally linked it to patterns
in other topic areas and may therefore have
overlooked the full extent of its generality. The
present investigation is intended to provide
some perspective on just how broadly valid it is
that bad is stronger than good. We certainly do
not intend to claim that the greater power of bad
things overrides all other principles of psychol-
ogy. Other relevant phenomena may include
congruency effects (good goes with good; bad
goes with bad) and self-aggrandizing patterns
(bad can be avoided or transformed into good).
Nevertheless, the general principle that bad is
stronger than good may have important impli-
cations for human psychology and behavior.
Definition implies rendering one concept in
terms of others, and the most fundamental ones
therefore will resist satisfactory definition.
Good, bad, and strength are among the most
universal and fundamental terms (e.g., Cassirer,
1955; Osgood & Tzeng, 1990), and it could be
argued that they refer to concepts that are un-
derstood even by creatures with minimal lin-
guistic capacity (such as small children and
even animals). By good we understand desir-
able, beneficial, or pleasant outcomes including
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states or consequences. Bad is the opposite:
undesirable, harmful, or unpleasant. Strength
refers to the causal impact. To say that bad is
stronger than good is thus to say that bad things
will produce larger, more consistent, more mul-
tifaceted, or more lasting effects than good
things.
A Brief Discussion: Why Should Bad Be
Stronger Than Good?
Offering an explanation for the greater power
of bad than good is likely to be an inherently
difficult enterprise. The very generality of the
pattern entails that there are likely to be few
principles that are even more broad and general.
Meanwhile, researchers will have found lower
level explanations that help explain why bad
may be stronger than good with regard to spe-
cific, narrowly defined phenomena.
From our perspective, it is evolutionarily
adaptive for bad to be stronger than good. We
believe that throughout our evolutionary his-
tory, organisms that were better attuned to bad
things would have been more likely to survive
threats and, consequently, would have increased
probability of passing along their genes. As an
example, consider the implications of foregoing
options or ignoring certain possible outcomes.
A person who ignores the possibility of a pos-
itive outcome may later experience significant
regret at having missed an opportunity for plea-
sure or advancement, but nothing directly terri-
ble is likely to result. In contrast, a person who
ignores danger (the possibility of a bad out-
come) even once may end up maimed or dead.
Survival requires urgent attention to possible
bad outcomes, but it is less urgent with regard to
good ones. Hence, it would be adaptive to be
psychologically designed to respond to bad
more strongly than good. After we review the
evidence for the phenomenon of bad being
stronger than good, we present a more complete
discussion of the theoretical reasons for the
strength of bad over good and also review other
theories that have been proposed in the context
of specific subareas (e.g., impression formation).
Evidence
The purpose of the following sections is to
review evidence pertaining to the central hy-
pothesis that bad is stronger than good. To
establish the breadth of the pattern, we try to
identify many seemingly different and diverse
spheres in which bad is stronger than good.
Given the breadth of the hypothesis, it is prob-
ably not possible to cover every study that has
ever found bad to be stronger than good in any
sphere. We have, however, tried to cover as
much as possible and to provide evidence for
the effect in as many different spheres as pos-
sible. How did we accomplish this? Unlike
more focused narrative reviews or meta-analy-
ses, we were unable to conduct a systematic
search using keywords such as good or bad.
Instead, we made an effort to cast as broad a net
as possible and then focus our search on several
research areas. As part of this process, we made
a request via e-mail to the members of the
Society for Personality and Social Psychology
list-serve. The roughly 100 responses received
from these members served as a starting point
for our search. After dividing our review into
several topic areas, we then set out to uncover
those studies that compared the relative strength
of good and bad effects, especially those that
also included a neutral control group.
The central goal of this review is to establish
convergence across multiple areas. The consis-
tency of conclusions across each area is more
important than the robustness or methodologi-
cal strength of evidence in each specific area.
We attempt to do justice to each area, but our
emphasis is on breadth (and on the quest for any
patterns in the opposite direction), so it seemed
desirable to cover as many different areas as
possible.
Reacting to Events
All lives contain both good and bad events. If
bad is stronger than good, then the bad events
will have longer lasting and more intense con-
sequences than good events. In particular, the
effects of good events should dissipate more
rapidly than the effects of bad events. This
should occur despite the mechanisms described
by Taylor (1991), by which many people strive
to minimize bad events and distance themselves
from them, although those minimizing pro-
cesses should limit the impact of bad events and
possibly produce some contrary findings.
A widely accepted account of the impact of
life events was put forward by Helson (1964)
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and called adaptation level theory. In this view,
the impact of substantial changes in life circum-
stances is temporary. People (and animals) react
more to changes than to stable conditions, so
they are most sensitive to new conditions.
Change, therefore, produces strong reactions,
but the circumstances that result from the
change gradually cease to elicit a reaction and
eventually become taken for granted. Applying
this theory to human happiness, Brickman and
Campbell (1971) postulated a "hedonic tread-
mill" by which long-term happiness will remain
roughly constant regardless of what happens
because the impact of both good and bad events
will wear off over time.
In testing the hedonic treadmill, however, it
emerged that bad events wear off more slowly
than good events. Brickman, Coates, and
Janoff-Bulman (1978) interviewed three groups
of respondents: people who had won a lottery,
people who had been paralyzed in an accident,
and people who had not recently experienced
any such major life event. The lottery wins and
accidents had occurred about 1 year before the
interview. Confirming the hypothesis for posi-
tive events, the lottery winners did not report
greater happiness than the two other groups.
Brickman et al. proposed that this result was
due to habituation, as the adaptation level phe-
nomenon would predict: The euphoria over the
lottery win did not last, and the winners' hap-
piness levels quickly returned to what they had
been before the lottery win. Ironically, perhaps,
the only lasting effect of winning the lottery
appeared to be the bad ones, such as a reduction
in enjoyment of ordinary pleasures.
In contrast to the transitory euphoria of good
fortune, the accident victims were much slower
to adapt to their fate, Brickman et al. (1978)
found. They rated themselves as significantly
less happy than participants in the control con-
dition. The victims continued to compare their
current situation with how their lives had been
before the accident (unlike lottery winners, who
did not seem to spend much time thinking how
their lives had improved from the bygone days
of relative poverty). Brickman et al. called this
phenomenon the "nostalgia effect" (p. 921).
The seeming implication of these findings is
that adaptation-level effects are asymmetrical,
consistent with the view that bad is stronger
than good. Adaptation-level effects tend to pre-
vent any lasting changes in overall happiness
and instead return people to their baseline. After
a short peak in happiness, people become ac-
customed to the new situation and are no more
happy than they were before the improvement.
After a serious misfortune, however, people ad-
just less quickly, even though many victims
ultimately do recover (Taylor, 1983).
Comparison of unanticipated financial out-
comes can equate the objective magnitude of
events. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) had par-
ticipants perform thought experiments in which
they either gained or lost the same amount of
money. The distress participants reported over
losing some money was greater than the joy or
happiness that accompanied gaining the same
amount of money. Put another way, you are
more upset about losing $50 than you are happy
about gaining $50.
In a prospective study of stress in pregnant
women, Wells, Hobfoll, and Lavin (1999) ex-
amined gains and losses of resources early in
pregnancy and measured postpartum outcomes
including depression and anger. Gains in re-
sources had no significant effects, but losses
produced significant effects on postpartum an-
ger (even after controlling for anger at the time
of initial measurement, which included anger at
the loss of resources). Wells et al. also found
that effects of subsequent losses of resources
were significantly higher among women who
had experienced the previous losses; whereas if
they had not had the initial loss, the effect of the
later loss was muted. These findings point to a
snowballing effect of consecutive bad out-
comes. Good outcomes did not produce any
such effects.
Developmental and clinical observations
likewise suggest that single bad events are far
stronger than even the strongest good ones. Var-
ious studies reveal long-term harmful conse-
quences of child abuse or sexual abuse, includ-
ing depression, relationship problems, revictim-
ization, and sexual dysfunction, even if the
abuse occurred only once or twice (Cahill,
Llewelyn, & Pearson, 1991; Fleming, Mullen,
Sibthorpe, & Bammer, 1999; Silver, Boon, &
Stones, 1983; Styron & Janoff-Bulman, 1997;
Weiss, Longhurst, & Mazure, 1999). These ef-
fects seem more durable than any comparable
positive aspect of childhood, and it also seems
doubtful (although difficult to prove) that a sin-
gle positive event could offset the harm caused
by a single episode of violent or sexual abuse;
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whereas the single negative event can probably
undo the benefits of many positive interactions.
Sexuality offers a sphere in which relevant
comparisons can perhaps be made, insofar as
good sexual experiences are often regarded as
among the best and most intense positive expe-
riences people have. Ample evidence suggests
that a single bad experience in the sexual do-
main can impair sexual functioning and enjoy-
ment and even have deleterious effects on
health and well-being for years afterward (see
Laumann, Gagon, Michael, & Michaels, 1994;
Laumann, Paik, & Rosen, 1999; Rynd, 1988;
note, however, that these are correlational find-
ings and some interpretive questions remain).
There is no indication that any good sexual
experience, no matter how good, can produce
benefits in which magnitude is comparable to
the harm caused by such victimization.
Turning from major experiences to everyday
actions, we find the same pattern of greater
power for the unpleasant than the pleasant
events. A diary study by David, Green, Martin,
and Suls (1997) examined the effects of every-
day good and bad events, as well as personality
traits. Undesirable (bad) events had more per-
vasive effects on subsequent mood than desir-
able (good) ones. Although each type of event
influenced the relevant mood (i.e., bad events
influenced bad mood, and good events predicted
good mood) to similar degrees, bad events had
an additional effect on the opposite-valence
mood that was lacking for good events. In other
words, bad events influenced both good and bad
moods, whereas good events influenced only
good moods. Similar findings emerged when
David et al. compared neuroticism (associated
with distress and negativity) and extraversion
(associated with positivity). Neuroticism influ-
enced both good and bad moods, whereas ex-
traversion affected only good moods.
Further evidence of the greater power of bad
events emerged from a 3-week longitudinal
study by Nezlek and Gable (1999). Their par-
ticipants furnished multiple measures of adjust-
ment each day, as well as recording daily
events. Bad events had stronger effects on ad-
justment than good events on an everyday basis.
The superior strength of bad events was consis-
tent across their full range of measures of ad-
justment, including self-esteem, anxiety, causal
uncertainty, perceived control over the environ-
ment, and depressogenic cognitions about the
future, the self, and life in general.
How long the impact of everyday events lasts
was studied by Sheldon, Ryan, and Reis (1996).
Bad events had longer lasting effects. In their
data, having a good day did not have any no-
ticeable effect on a person's well-being the fol-
lowing day, whereas having a bad day did carry
over and influence the next day. Specifically,
after a bad day, participants were likely to have
lower well-being on the next day. Although the
results are technically correlational, something
must cause them, whether it is the bad day itself
causing the subsequent bad day or some other
cause producing the consecutive pair of bad
days. Either way, the bad has stronger power
than good because only the bad reliably pro-
duced consecutive bad days.
Even at the sensory level, bad events seem to
produce stronger reactions than good ones. Ex-
pressive reactions to unpleasant, pleasant, and
neutral odors were examined by Gilbert, Frid-
lund, and Sabini (1987). Participants smelled
various odors while alone, and their facial ex-
pressions were videotaped. Raters then watched
the tapes and tried to infer the odor from the
facial reaction. Unpleasant odors were most ac-
curately classified, partly because more facial
movement was perceived in the unpleasant odor
trials. Pleasant odors elicited more facial move-
ment than neutral odors, but the neutral ones
were still rated more accurately than the posi-
tive ones. Thus, responses to unpleasant odors
were apparently stronger, at least to the extent
that they could be accurately recognized by
raters.
Perhaps the broadest manifestation of the
greater power of bad events than good to elicit
lasting reactions is contained in the psychology
of trauma. The very concept of trauma has
proven broadly useful, and psychologists have
found it helpful in many different domains.
Many kinds of traumas produce severe and last-
ing effects on behavior, but there is no corre-
sponding concept of a positive event that can
have similarly strong and lasting effects. In a
sense, trauma has no true opposite concept. A
single traumatic experience can have long-term
effects on the person's health, well-being, atti-
tudes, self-esteem, anxiety, and behavior; many
such effects have been documented. In contrast,
there is little evidence that single positive expe-
riences can have equally influential conse-
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quences. It is possible that such events have
simply eluded psychological study, but it seems
more likely that the lack of an opposite concept
for trauma indicates the greater power of bad
than good single events to affect people.
Although the findings from Brickman et al.
(1978) and others reviewed in this section pro-
vide vivid and well-known indications that bad
events produce stronger, more lasting reactions
than good ones, some of the studies suffer from
a possible asymmetry in the objective magni-
tude of the event. There is no way to ascertain
objectively that winning a lottery is comparable
in magnitude to becoming paralyzed by an ac-
cident. The diary studies have the advantage of
having used all the events of the day, so these
are methodologically more useful. Most con-
vincing are the studies that attempted to ensure
equal objective magnitudes (such as when peo-
ple gain vs. lose the same amount of money)
because these permit the firmest conclusions
that bad events produce stronger reactions.
Therefore, throughout the rest of this review, we
emphasize studies that either did manage to
equate the good and the bad events in terms of
their objective magnitude or that took some
broad, representative or exhaustive sample of
events.
In summary, most findings indicate that peo-
ple react more strongly to bad than good events.
The evidence covers everything from minor ev-
eryday events and brief experimental exposure
to aversive odors to major life events and trau-
mas. Bad events produce more emotion, have
bigger effects on adjustment measures, and
have longer lasting effects.
Close Relationships
One of the central tasks and goals of human
life is to sustain a network of close relationships
characterized by mutual caring and pleasant,
supportive interactions (e.g., Baumeister &
Leary, 1995). Unfortunately, many relation-
ships fail to last, and others are sometimes less
than satisfactory. In this section, we review
evidence about good versus bad patterns that
contribute to the long-term relationship out-
comes. Obviously, one would expect that bad,
destructive characteristics of the relationship
will hasten its demise; whereas good, construc-
tive ones will preserve it. The relevant predic-
tion goes beyond that, however: The harmful
effects of the bad characteristics will exert more
influence over the relationship outcome than the
beneficial effects of the good characteristics.
People commonly believe that positivity of
communication (as opposed to negativity) is
associated with high relational satisfaction (e.g.,
friendships, marriages, partnerships, and fami-
lies). In general, research findings are consistent
with this assumption. People satisfied with their
relationships communicate with more positive
verbal behaviors (e.g., agreement, confirmation,
constructive problem solving, politeness, ex-
pressing forgiveness) and nonverbal behaviors
(e.g., smiling, head nodding, caring, or con-
cerned voice; for more detailed descriptions of
these behaviors, see Gottman, 1979; Riskin &
Faunce, 1970; Rusbult, Johnson, & Morrow,
1986; Stafford & Canary, 1991; Ting-Toomey,
1983; Wills, Weiss, & Patterson, 1974). On the
contrary, people dissatisfied with their relation-
ships communicate with more negative verbal
behaviors (e.g., insults, threats, or criticisms)
and nonverbal behaviors (e.g., frowning or
speaking in a cold hard voice).
More important, however, positive and neg-
ative communication have different impacts on
relational satisfaction, and the negative are
more decisive. To show this, John Gottman and
his colleagues (Gottman, 1979, 1994) video-
taped married couples in the laboratory and at
home as they talked about a wide variety of
topics such as how their day went, the nutri-
tional value of certain foods, marital problems
in general, and specific conflicts in their rela-
tionship. They then coded the couple's behav-
iors in categories (e.g., verbal, nonverbal, pos-
itive, and negative). The findings indicated that
the presence or absence of negative behaviors
was more strongly related to the quality of cou-
ples' relationships than the presence or absence
of positive behaviors. Positivity and negativity
were independent, in the sense that increasing
one did not necessarily decrease the other. The
important implication is that increasing positive
behaviors in a relationship will not affect the
relationship as much as decreasing negative be-
haviors. In another study in which videotaped
marital interactions were used, Gottman and
Krokoff (1989) found that negative interactions
predicted marital satisfaction more strongly
than positive interactions.
The effects of emotional interactions on
changes in relationship satisfaction were exam-
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ined by Gottman and Levenson (1986; Leven-
son & Gottman, 1983, 1985). They made vid-
eotapes of couples interacting, then showed the
interaction tapes to the individuals and obtained
ongoing ratings of affect through the interac-
tion. Of particular interest were data on reci-
procity, defined in terms of one person express-
ing a similar emotion or change in emotion right
after the partner had indicated similar feelings.
Reciprocity of negative affect was especially
potent and in particular was more influential
than reciprocity of positive affect. The greater
influence of negative affect reciprocity was
found with regard to differentiating happy ver-
sus distressed marriages (Levenson & Gottman,
1983). In a longitudinal follow-up 2 years later,
the couples who had initially shown higher rates
of negative affect reciprocity reported greater
declines in relationship satisfaction, whereas
reciprocity of positive affect had no significant
effect (Levenson & Gottman, 1985). In sum-
mary, relationships are most affected by pat-
terns in which one person responds negatively
to the other's negative act or feeling.
On the basis of these results, Gottman (1994)
has proposed a revealing diagnostic index for
evaluating relationships: He proposed that in
order for a relationship to succeed, positive and
good interactions must outnumber the negative
and bad ones by at least five to one. If the ratio
falls below that, the relationship is likely to fail
and breakup. This index converges well with
the thrust of our argument: Bad events are so
much stronger than good ones that the good
must outnumber the bad in order to prevail.
Gottman's index suggests that bad events are on
average five times as powerful as good ones, at
least with regard to close relationships.
Constructive and destructive problem-solv-
ing behavior patterns for relationships were
studied by Rusbult et al. (1986; see also Rusbult
& Zembrodt, 1983). They were able to classify
couples as to the degree to which they used
constructive and destructive approaches to
problems, and these were assessed indepen-
dently so that a given couple might use both,
either, or none. In a longitudinal design, Rusbult
et al. showed that the destructive patterns were
more predictive of relationship outcomes than
constructive ones were. In particular, destruc-
tive responses to the partner's destructive re-
sponses showed a greatly increased predictive
power. This finding confirms Levenson and
Gottman's (1985) conclusion that reciprocity of
bad responses is an especially potent predictor
of relationship outcomes (and is stronger than
reciprocity of good responses). The implication
is that the long-term success of a relationship
depends more on not doing bad things than on
doing good things.
A similar conclusion emerged from a recent
longitudinal study by Huston, Caughlin, Houts,
Smith, and George (2001). By following cou-
ples for more than a decade, they were able to
ascertain what features of early marital relation-
ships predicted divorce (and other unhappi-
ness) 10 to 12 years later. Huston et al. found
that levels of negativity and distress early in the
marriage were higher among the later divorcing
couples than among the happily married ones.
Positive relations during the early years of mar-
riage, including love and affectional communi-
cation, did not differ significantly between the
ones who ended up divorcing and those who
ended up happily married. Without random as-
signment to early marital conflict (a technical
and ethical impossibility), it is difficult to draw
a firm causal inference from these data. It also
remains possible that the early distress reflected
some underlying conflict or even personality
problem among the later divorcing spouses, but
even that conclusion would fit the view that bad
is stronger than good.
Even stronger results emerged from a 2-year
longitudinal study by Huston and Vangelisti
(1991). They measured three types of socio-
emotionally expressive behavior among newly-
wed couples: affectionate communication, sex-
ual interest, and negativity. Sexual affection had
no relation to marital satisfaction, and giving or
receiving affection had only weak and inconsis-
tent relationships to satisfaction. In contrast,
negativity had strong and consistent links to
global marital satisfaction. Thus, people's sat-
isfaction with their marriage depended much
more heavily on the bad parts (negativity) than
on the good parts (affection and sex).
In support of this idea, sexual dysfunction
was found to have a greater effect on the marital
bond than good sexual functioning. McCarthy
(1999) reported that when sexuality functions
well within a marriage, it accounts for 15-20%
of the variance in the marital bond, but when
sex functioning is bad or nonexistent (which
most married couples would consider a bad
state), it accounts for 50-75% of the variance.
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The power of bad sexual experiences, then, far
outweighs the benefits of good sexual experi-
ences within a marriage.
One factor that may contribute to some of
these effects is that destructive behaviors are
understood better than constructive ones.
Acitelli, Douvan, and Veroff (1993) found that
during the early years of marriage, couples per-
ceived and understood each other's destructive
behaviors better than the constructive ones.
Acitelli et al. interpreted this as based on the
greater visibility and recall of bad, destructive
behaviors. As Kellermann (1984) has noted,
however, such explanations are not theoretically
complete because they fail to say why bad
events are more readily noticed and recalled.
Daily reports of spousal behaviors and mari-
tal satisfaction were made for 2 weeks by par-
ticipants in a study by Wills et al. (1974). Of the
amount of variance (in marital satisfaction) that
the predictor variables were able to explain in
regression analyses, the majority (65%) was
captured by the aversive, displeasurable behav-
iors. This was significantly greater than the
amount explained by supportive, pleasurable
behaviors (25%). This was true despite the fact
that there were about three times as many pos-
itive behaviors as aversive ones. The greater
power of the bad behaviors had to overcome
their lesser number in order to produce a stron-
ger effect.
Reciprocation patterns were also examined
by Wills et al. (1974). Interspouse correlations
indicated that negative, displeasurable behav-
iors were reciprocated to a significant degree,
whereas the reciprocation of positive, pleasur-
able behaviors was weaker and not significant.
This is an important step toward explaining the
greater power of bad events to affect relation-
ship outcomes: The couples' subsequent inter-
actions are apparently more directly and consis-
tently affected by bad than good behaviors. As
with the daily events reviewed in the preceding
section, couple interactions continue to be af-
fected by bad more than good.
The relative contributions of stress (negative
factors), social support (positive), and resources
(positive) to the quality of family life were
assessed in an extensive telephone survey by
Pittman and Lloyd (1988). Both marital satis-
faction and parental satisfaction were more
strongly affected by the bad events (i.e., the
stresses) than by the positive (i.e., support and
resources). Thus, negativity and stress added
more than 20% to the amount of variance in
marital satisfaction that was explained, whereas
positive support and resources added only 5%.
All in all, the evidence is fairly clear and
unanimous in indicating that relationships are
more affected by bad events than good ones. As
seen in daily interactions, broad patterns, affect
of problem solving, and marital communica-
tion, bad events have stronger effects than good
events. Reciprocation of bad responses appears
to be especially powerful for leading to deteri-
oration and breakup of close relationships.
Other Relationships and Interactions
Although close relationships have received
the greatest amount of study, there is also some
relevant information regarding not-so-close re-
lationships and other forms of interpersonal in-
teraction. We report several such studies here,
although the research on formation of initial
impressions is covered in a separate section
later in the article.
Sociometric studies have examined how in-
dividuals perceive each other within established
groups or social networks. If bad is stronger
than good, then dislike and social rejection
should be more pronounced, which would be
reflected in higher agreement throughout the
social network. A meta-analysis of sociometric
studies of children recently confirmed this con-
clusion (Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993).
In particular, the two social extremes were rep-
resented by the highly popular children and the
rejected children, and these were about the same
proportions (9% and 12% of the groups, respec-
tively, on average). Consistency of reports
across the children, as well as for self-reports
and for ratings by teachers and parents, was
higher for the rejected than for the popular
children. In other words, all perspectives agree
more about who is rejected than about who is
popular.
Another approach to the same problem is to
examine the link between naming someone as
"best friend" or "worst enemy" and overall rat-
ings of ability. An ambitious study by French,
Waas, and Tarver-Behring (1986) obtained ex-
tensive sociometric data from 250 third- and
fourth-grade children. All children listed their
three most and least desired friends, as well as
listing the three best and worst peers at sports
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and at schoolwork. All children then rated ev-
eryone in their class in terms of friendship,
sports, and schoolwork. The proportion of vari-
ance shared by the two methods was consis-
tently higher for the bad than for the good; that
is, low ratings led to more frequent nominations
as "undesirable friend," "bad at sports," and
"bad at schoolwork" more reliably than high
ratings led to more frequent nominations as
"desirable friend," "good at sports," and "good
at school."
Undoubtedly the initial acts in an interaction
create expectancies and set the tone for further
ones, and if subsequent acts differ, the expect-
ancies are violated. The impact of these was
assessed by Afifi and Burgoon (2000), who had
participants observe a videotaped interaction.
Their research design included changes from
initially negative to positive and from initially
positive to negative interactions. These violated
expectancies produced strong reactions, but the
violations in the negative direction had stronger
effects on attraction. Their finding that changes
produced stronger reactions than consistent in-
terpersonal behavior replicated an earlier dem-
onstration by Aronson and Linder (1965), but
Afifi and Burgoon's work clearly showed that
the shift toward the negative has a more pow-
erful effect than the comparable shift toward the
positive. That is, the largest change in attraction
occurred when the stimulus person on the vid-
eotape started off by behaving in a friendly,
interested manner and then turned aloof and
unfriendly.
A further investigation by Reyes et al. (1999)
showed that both social attraction and sexual
desire were more strongly influenced by nega-
tive, unpleasant social interactions than by pos-
itive, pleasant ones. Participants who behaved
in the unpleasant style produced clear (negative)
reactions that were stronger than the reactions to
people who showed a positive, friendly interac-
tion style.
The notion that bad is stronger than good in
social interactions received a fairly explicit test
in a recent study. Exline and Baumeister (1999)
had people play prisoner's dilemma against a
simulated opponent who was randomly pro-
grammed to start off with either a cooperative
(good) or a defensive/exploitative (bad) move.
When participants were asked to rate their op-
ponent, the one who started off with the bad
move was rated as stronger than the one who
started off with the cooperative move. Partici-
pants also rated the bad opponent as stronger
than they themselves were, unlike the coopera-
tive opponent.
In fact, when Baumeister and Leary (1995)
reviewed the evidence in support of a need to
belong, they concluded that that need was for
nonnegative interactions, rather than positive
ones as they had originally theorized. The rea-
son was that neutral interactions seemed ade-
quate to satisfy the need to belong in many
cases. This too confirms the greater power of
bad: The effects of positive, good interactions
were not consistently different from the effects
of neutral interactions, whereas bad ones were
clearly different from the neutral.
Emotion
The distinction between good and bad (pleas-
ant and unpleasant) emotions is well established
in psychology and familiar to nearly everyone.
Although laypersons typically regard these as
opposites, there is some evidence that the two
are somewhat independent (e.g., Watson & Tel-
legen, 1985), and indeed measures of affect
intensity (e.g., Larsen, Diener, & Emmons,
1986) rest on the assumption that positive and
negative emotions can be positively correlated
within person, even though a person does not
normally feel both at the same time. Diener,
Larsen, Levine, and Emmons (1985) concluded
that the seeming independence is produced by a
combination of positive correlations in affective
intensity and negative correlations in frequency.
In any case, it is possible to compare positive
and negative emotional states against neutral
ones. The prediction is that negative affect and
emotional distress will have stronger effects
than positive affect and pleasant emotions, even
when the two emotional states or traits are
equally distant from the neutral position.
Language provides one index of relative
power, although naturally language is subject to
multiple determinants. To the extent that nega-
tive emotions are more powerful and important,
they should be more fully represented in the
language. Sure enough, there appear to be more
words for negative than positive emotions.
Averill (1980) constructed a Semantic Atlas of
Emotional Concepts by an exhaustive compila-
tion of 558 emotion words. When he had par-
ticipants rate them, he found that there were one
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and one-half times as many negative terms as
positive ones (i.e., 62% negative vs. 38% posi-
tive), which differed significantly from the null
hypothesis that there would be 50% of each.
Averill also had three judges sort Anderson's
(1965) list of 555 personality traits into emo-
tional and nonemotional traits. He then evalu-
ated them according to whether they fell above
or below the midpoint on Anderson's original
likeableness ratings. Among the nonemotional
traits, there was a small preponderance of pos-
itive traits (57%), but among the emotional
traits, the negative ones were in a clear majority
(74%). Clearly, then, there are more words for
bad emotions than for good ones.
A similar conclusion emerged (although tan-
gentially) from a study by Van Goozen and
Frijda (1993). They instructed participants in
six different European countries and Canada to
write down as many emotion words as they
could think of within 5 min. The researchers
then tallied the 12 most frequently mentioned
words in each country. They reported that joy,
sadness, anger, and fear (three of which are
negative) were the ones that made all six coun-
tries' lists of the top dozen. If surprise, excite-
ment, and crying are all treated as neutral (be-
cause they can be either positive or negative),
all the countries except The Netherlands had
more negative than positive words among the
top dozen. Thus, when people try to think of
emotion terms, they come up with a preponder-
ance of words referring to negative emotions.
This too suggests that bad emotions are more
important to label and discuss than good
emotions.
Other work has confirmed that there are many
more words to indicate negative emotional
states and differentiate among them than is the
case for positive emotional states (Clore & Or-
tony, 1988; Russell, Fernandez-Dols, Manstead,
& Wellenkamp, 1995). Thus, negative words
appear to be more varied than positive words, or
at least people seem to find it more important to
recognize and label the distinctions between
them.
Another sign of the relative power of bad
versus good emotions is evident in research on
affect regulation. People often try to change
their moods and have many techniques for do-
ing so. Naturally, there is an asymmetry to their
goals: for purely hedonic reasons, people prefer
to avoid bad emotions and obtain good ones.
Those two goals can be separated, however, and
one can examine the relative frequency and
number of techniques for each. Doing so yields
a clear difference: There are many more tech-
niques people use for escaping bad moods than
for inducing good ones. Baumeister, Heather-
ton, and Tice (1994) noted that there are six
possible categories of affect regulation, consist-
ing of efforts to induce, prolong, or terminate
either a pleasant or an unpleasant state. Of
these, however, efforts to terminate the unpleas-
ant states are by far the most frequently re-
ported. The fact that people exert disproportion-
ate amounts of energy trying to escape from bad
moods (and in particular more than they exert to
induce good moods) is consistent with the hy-
pothesis of greater power of negative emotions.
The effect of induced good and bad moods on
cognitive processing (in connection with stereo-
types) was studied by Esses and Zanna (1995).
Across four studies, they consistently found that
bad moods had a bigger impact than good
moods, in terms of the discrepancies from the
neutral mood condition. In some of the studies,
this could be ascribed to a weaker difference
among the mood manipulations. In Experi-
ment 4, for example, the manipulation checks
on self-reported moods did not yield any signif-
icant difference between the neutral and good
mood induction conditions. In Experiments 2
and 3, the neutral mood condition yielded
moods closer to the positive than the negative
mood condition. In Experiment 1, however, the
manipulation checks showed that the two mood
manipulations were about equally far apart: In
terms of the autobiographical narrative in the
mood induction, the pleasantness of the posi-
tive, neutral, and negative conditions was 2.25,
-.03, and -2.21, respectively, and the self-re-
ported moods were 1.79,0.69, and -.49. Despite
the apparently equal departure in mood from the
neutral condition baseline, the bad mood induc-
tion produced bigger effects on ethnic outgroup
stereotypes: Only the negative mood induction
produced stereotypes that differed significantly
from the neutral mood baseline. Thus, when
good and bad moods were equidistant from the
neutral control, the bad moods were found to
have the stronger effects.
Recall for positive versus negative emotions
was studied by Thomas and Diener (1990), who
compared diary and experience sampling data
against the same people's general estimates of
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their emotional experiences. They found that
people tended to underestimate the frequency of
positive affect, but not negative affect, which is
consistent with the view that the relative weak-
ness of positive emotional experiences makes
them more forgettable. (It may also be, how-
ever, that positive affect is so much more fre-
quent than negative affect and that the greater
frequency accounts for the relative underesti-
mation. Then again, Thomas and Diener did
find that people were fairly accurate in estimat-
ing the ratio of relative frequency of positive
versus negative affect.)
Likewise, recall for emotional events appears
to favor bad ones. Finkenauer and Rime" (1998)
asked people to recall a recent, important emo-
tional event that they had either shared with
others or kept secret. Although both positive
and negative emotional events were welcome,
and both were recalled, people reported far
more bad than good events, by about a four-to-
one margin across two studies. Thus, events
involving bad emotions remain more salient on
people's minds than events involving good
emotions.
People's estimations of how long or intensely
various events will affect them has been termed
affective forecasting (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Gilbert et al.
found that, in general, people overestimate the
extent to which events in their lives will affect
them. Moreover, the data reveal that this phe-
nomenon is stronger for negative events than for
positive ones. These data suggest that people
have a cognitive heuristic that informs them that
negative events are powerful influences on sub-
sequent affective states, more so than positive
events, and therefore will affect them longer.
Children's understanding of emotional con-
cepts was studied by Laible and Thompson
(1998) in relation to attachment style. Not sur-
prisingly, secure attachment was linked to better
emotional understanding in the sample (age 2.5
to 6 years), but this effect was mainly found
with negative emotions. Positive emotions were
understood about the same in the various cate-
gories. The opposite finding might have been
expected, given that secure attachment is pre-
sumably associated with more experiences of
positive rather than negative emotions, but the
results fit the pattern of bad emotions being
stronger (or at least more important) than good
ones. Laible and Thompson speculated that the
effects were due to the greater need among
nonsecurely attached (such as avoidant) chil-
dren to avoid negative, unpleasant emotions,
with the result that they are slower to develop an
understanding of them. This interpretation was
admittedly speculative. Still, it does rest on the
assumption that bad emotions are more impor-
tant than good ones, so children who do not
have optimal attachment patterns find it more
important to downplay bad emotions than to
focus on good ones.
The emotional traits of positive and negative
affectivity were studied by Major, Zubek, Coo-
per, Cozzarelli, and Richards (1997) in terms of
their effects on adjustment following abortion.
A commendable feature of Major et al.'s design
is that they measured positive and negative out-
comes separately, allowing for subjective well-
being and personal distress to be assessed inde-
pendently. Well-being was predicted by both
positive and negative affectivity, and with
roughly equal power. Distress, however, was
only predicted by negative affectivity. Thus,
negative affect influenced both outcome mea-
sures, whereas positive affect influenced only
one.
There is also evidence that bad moods elicit
more thorough and careful information process-
ing than good moods (e.g., Clore, Schwarz, &
Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 1990). These findings
are consistent with Taylor's (1991) view that
negative information stimulates a special set of
processes designed to cope with threat. Yet
even when a person is not threatened, bad
moods seem to lead to greater processing. For
example, Bless, Hamilton, and Mackie (1992)
induced good and bad moods and then pre-
sented to participants information about some-
one else. They found that participants in good
moods tended to cluster information and pro-
cess it superficially, whereas people in bad
moods processed it more carefully. Forgas
(1992) extended this work to study the effects of
good and bad moods on information about peo-
ple who either conform to prototypes (stereo-
types) or violate them (e.g., the engineer who is
vs. the engineer who is not interested in foot-
ball). The strongest mood effect involved the
bad mood and the atypical, nonconforming per-
son, which is precisely the combination that
also elicited the most processing.
An exception to the general pattern of thor-
ough, careful information processing during bad
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moods was provided by Leith and Baumeister
(1996). They focused mainly on high-arousal
bad moods, in contrast to most prior work that
has emphasized low-arousal moods such as sad-
ness. Leith and Baumeister did, however, repli-
cate the greater processing among sad partici-
pants. They found that highly aroused, aversive
moods led participants to curtail information
processing and make snap decisions when
choosing what level of risk to choose (see also
Keinan, 1987). Although this result did not con-
form to the general pattern of greater processing
with bad moods, Leith and Baumeister still
found that bad was stronger than good. The
highly aroused, unhappy participants showed
distinctive patterns of high-risk and self-defeat-
ing behavior, whereas good-mood participants
did not differ from neutral-mood control
participants.
Thus, there is an assortment of evidence that
negative affect is stronger and more important
than positive affect. People have more words
for bad emotions than good ones and use them
more frequently. Bad emotions generally pro-
duce more cognitive processing and have other
effects on behavior that are stronger than posi-
tive emotions. People try harder to avoid and
escape bad moods than to induce or prolong
good moods, and they remember bad moods
and emotions better.
Learning
Learning refers to behavioral or cognitive
change resulting from situational contingencies.
Reinforcement and punishment are the two
main kinds of situational feedback that produce
learning. Given the extensive research tradition
in the study of learning, one might expect that
the relative power of reward and punishment
would be well established, but in fact we found
it difficult to locate much in the way of direct
comparisons. One reason is that most learning
research has been performed with rats, in which
food pellets are used for rewards and electric
shock for punishments, and it is difficult to
calibrate these so as to establish how many food
pellets are equivalent to how many shocks.
Still, some researchers have examined the
relative power of reward and punishment. In
several older studies, researchers compared the
effectiveness of reward-and-punishment contin-
gencies on discriminative learning of tasks that
require an active response from participants (in
contrast with tasks that require the inhibition of
a response). The punishment of incorrect re-
sponses (by the presentation of an aversive
stimulus on mistakes) was consistently found to
be more effective than the reward of correct
responses: Punishment led to faster learning
than reward, across a variety of punishments
and rewards. Penney and Lupton (1961) and
Penney (1968) used a loud tone as punishment,
and Meyer and Offenbach (1962) and Spence
(1966) used verbal punishments ("Wrong").
Spence and Segner (1967) compared nonverbal
and verbal punishments (i.e., loud tone and
"Wrong") with nonverbal and verbal rewards
(i.e., candy and "Correct") and found that learn-
ing with both types of punishment contingen-
cies led to superior learning as compared with
learning with either type of reward contingen-
cies. In other words, people learned more
quickly from bad events (punishment) than
from good ones (reward).
This work was extended in methodologically
rigorous ways by Costantini and Hoving (1973).
Children in the reward condition received an
empty container and were instructed to win as
many marbles as possible by doing a good job
on different performance tasks (e.g., match
identical figures). Children in the punishment
condition received a container full of marbles
and were instructed to lose as few marbles as
possible by doing a good job on different per-
formance tasks. This procedure is noteworthy
because it equates reward and punishment in an
important sense, insofar as the same number of
marbles was contingent on performance. The
only difference was that the child would gain
marbles for success in one condition but lose
marbles for errors in the other condition. (In
contrast, the procedure of comparing candy re-
wards vs. loud noise punishments is susceptible
to question about whether the rewards and pun-
ishments were of equal magnitude.) Because
Costantini and Hoving were interested in how
well children could learn to inhibit responses,
the measures consisted of (a) walking as slowly
as possible over a board lying on the floor and
(b) waiting as long as possible to tell the exper-
imenter after discovering matched animals. For
both tasks, punishment contingencies (losing
marbles) resulted in longer, more effective in-
hibition of responses than reward contingencies.
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To explain these results, Costantini and Hov-
ing (1973) suggested that the motivation to
avoid losing something is greater than the mo-
tivation of gaining something. In our view, this
conclusion is another way of saying that bad is
stronger than good.
To examine whether the effectiveness of pun-
ishment on learning varies across developmen-
tal stages, Tindall and Ratliff (1974) conducted
a study among 540 first (6.4 years), fourth (9.4
years), and eighth graders (13.5 years). Children
were assigned to three conditions. In the reward
condition, they received a token for correct re-
sponses (correctly identifying a particular fig-
ure). In the punishment condition, children were
exposed to a loud noise for incorrect responses.
In the reward-punishment condition, they re-
ceived both a token for a correct response and a
loud noise for an incorrect response. Children in
the punishment condition performed signifi-
cantly better than children in the reward and the
reward-punishment conditions, with no signif-
icant difference between the two latter condi-
tions. A main effect for developmental stage
revealed that eighth graders performed better
than the first and fourth graders, but develop-
mental stage did not show any interaction with
experimental condition, suggesting that punish-
ment is relatively more effective than reward
across all grade levels.
Textbooks in learning and education some-
times assert that reward is better than punish-
ment for learning, but they do not provide a
clear basis for this assertion. The assertion itself
would provide an important contradiction to the
general pattern of bad being stronger than good.
Yet they may assert the superiority of reward
over punishment because of various side effects
of punishment, such as aggravation, anger, and
even disorientation, any of which could inter-
fere with optimal learning. Such interference
could even occur because bad events are stron-
ger than good ones and because bad events
produce side effects, whereas good ones do not.
In any case, the studies we have reviewed show
that punishment is stronger than reward. We
were not able to find studies showing the
opposite.
Another way of testing the relative power of
good versus bad in learning is to compare ap-
proach (good) and avoidance (bad) patterns. In
an overview of the early research on these is-
sues, Miller (1944) noted that both approach
tendencies and avoidance tendencies grow
stronger as the object becomes nearer, but one
"fundamental principle" from many studies was
that "the strength of avoidance increases more
rapidly with nearness than does that of ap-
proach" (p. 433). Put another way, the avoid-
ance gradient is steeper than the comparable
approach gradient, which indicates the superior
power of bad. Miller cited experimental studies
by Brown (1940) that provided direct, precise
tests of these variables, such as the examination
of how hard rats would pull against a restraint in
order to approach or avoid some stimulus. In
some studies, Brown used both strong and weak
versions of both the reinforcers and punishers,
but even so the avoidance gradient for the
weaker punisher was steeper than the approach
gradient for the stronger reinforcer (see Miller,
1944, p. 435).
A similar conclusion was reached, in which
human beings and different methods were used,
by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). They exam-
ined the relationship between subjective and
objective values of various possible outcomes,
which they termed the value function. In gen-
eral, Kahneman and Tversky concluded that the
value function is steeper for losses than for
gains. A given increase in possible loss there-
fore has a bigger impact on a decision than an
objectively equal increase in possible gain.
One of the few ways to make reward and
punishment comparable is to use money: Re-
search participants receive money for some be-
haviors and lose money for others, and if the
amounts are identical, one can establish which
is stronger. This strategy was used by research-
ers in an approach-avoidance situation in con-
nection with wagering and gambling. Atthowe
(1960) had people choose among various pos-
sible wagers to see how their preferences var-
ied. Some people were completely rational, in
the sense of consistently making the choices
with the best expected value. Others departed
from rationality in either direction. The "con-
servative" individuals were defined by Atthowe
as those whose choices reflected "an overcon-
cern with the possibility of losing money"
(1960, p. 4; thus, for them, bad was stronger
than good). In contrast, people showing the
"extravagance" pattern showed the opposite
motivation, in which they emphasized the pos-
sibility of gain and disregarded the possibility of
loss. Among the people in Atthowe's study who
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were consistently nonrational in their choices,
the vast majority (83%) fell into the conserva-
tive (i.e., loss-avoiding instead of gain-pursu-
ing) category. Moreover, across the entire sam-
ple, the majority (71%) of all nonrational
choices were conservative.
Similar findings with a different task were
reported by J. L. Myers, Reilly, and Taub
(1961): Choices were more affected by the
chance of losing than by the chance of gaining
money. Thus, although there does exist a mi-
nority of behavior that is driven more by seek-
ing gains than by avoiding losses, the clear and
consistent majority is primarily motivated by
the effort to avoid loss, which implies that for
most people, bad is stronger than good when it
comes to financial outcomes.
Food likes and dislikes are among the most
clear-cut and immediate reactions in humans.
Pavlovian associative learning offers an expla-
nation for the association between food and
liking. In animal studies, it has been demon-
strated that the flavor of a certain food (condi-
tional stimulus) becomes intrinsically disliked
after contingent presentation of this flavor with
an unconditioned stimulus that produces nausea
or vomit-producing reactions (Garcia & Koel-
ling, 1966). This effect is known as conditioned
taste aversion learning.
The relative power of good and bad associ-
ates in taste learning among human beings was
investigated by Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh,
and Crombez (1990). Artificial flavors that were
initially neutral in valence were paired with
either an aversive, distasteful substance (Tween20
polysorbate 20) or a pleasant-tasting substance
(sugar). After about 12 trials, the bad stimulus
had induced participants to dislike the artificial
flavors, and these effects were still discernible
in a follow-up measure 1 week later. The pleas-
ant stimulus failed to induce participants to like
the flavors any better, nor was there any signif-
icant effect on the delayed measure. Thus, the
bad stimulus had a stronger effect than the good
one, in terms of learning.
Thus, there are several findings indicating
that learning and conditioning are more strongly
affected by bad things than good, even when the
objective magnitude of good and bad is pre-
cisely equated. People appear to be predisposed
to learn more rapidly and easily about the cor-
relates of negative than of positive events.
Neurological Processes
Some evidence suggests that responses in the
brain are stronger to bad than good things. Bar-
tholow, Fabiani, Gratton, and Bettencourt
(1999) examined event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) in response to participants reading about
people performing acts that were either consis-
tent or inconsistent with personality descrip-
tions. Larger amplitude P300 responses were
observed following negative inconsistencies
(i.e., people with positive traits performing bad
behaviors) than positive inconsistencies (people
with bad traits performing good behaviors).
These amplitudes reflect degree of information
processing and thus are consistent with the ev-
idence of greater information processing.
Even more dramatic evidence comes from
studies linking brain responses to learning and
extinction of fear responses. Apparently fear-
inducing events leave indelible memory traces
in the brain (LeDoux, Romanski, & Xagoraris,
1989; Quirk, Repa, & LeDoux, 1995). Even
after the behavioral response to a fear-inducing
conditioned stimulus has been extinguished, the
brain retains a changed pattern of neuronal fir-
ing in response to that stimulus and of neuronal
connections between cells (Quirk et al., 1995;
Sanghera, Rolls, & Roper-Hall, 1979).
In an investigation of the effect of reaction
times during a forced-choice paradigm found
that even patients with brain damage are af-
fected by different types of feedback (Gauggel,
Wietasch, Bayer, & Rolko, 2000). Brain-dam-
aged patients with varying etiologies displayed
faster reaction times after (false) negative feed-
back (an effect that remained even when statis-
tically controlling for depression), suggesting
that even among patients with profound brain
damage, bad still outweighs good.
The existence of a specific brain mechanism
to detect self-generated errors (Luu et al., 2000)
also suggests that the brain is wired to react
more strongly to bad than good. Errors and
mistakes are, obviously, unintended responses
and hence are more likely to lead to bad out-
comes than good outcomes. Research confirms
the existence of a neurological process that rec-
ognizes self-initiated errors. For instance, stud-
ies in which participants are asked to make
continued response adjustments have shown
that participants know they have made an error,
even in the absence of feedback (e.g., Rabbitt,
BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 337
1966). Moreover, there is a discernible change
in the electrophysiological state of the brain that
occurs soon after an error is made (within 80-
100 ms). This brain response is measured by
using ERP methods and is called error-related
negativity (ERN). The results of another ERP
study also support the existence of a neural
marker for error detection (Miltner, Braun, &
Coles, 1997). Using ERP methods, Miltner et
al. found a pattern in the anterior cingulate—a
neurological substrate thought to be central to
self-regulatory abilities (see Posner, 1994)—
similar to the negative pattern reported by Luu,
Collins, & Tucker (2000). Moreover, Miltner et
al. saw this neurological marker across three
different sensory modalities (visual, auditory,
and somatosensory), suggesting that our brains
have a generic system for recognizing self-ini-
tiated errors.
Recently it has been suggested that ERN may
"represent a means of tracking human self-mon-
itoring in real time" (p. 45, Luu et al., 2000). It
is noteworthy that errors, which themselves are
bad (because they are unintended responses)
and which are strongly linked to aversive con-
sequences, appear to have a neurological corre-
late; whereas there does not seem to be an
analogous neurological reaction for correct
responses.
The effect of negative versus positive stimuli
on neurological indices of evaluative categori-
zation also supports our proposition that bad
outweighs good. Using ERP methodology, Ito,
Cacioppo, and Lang (1998) found that brain
activation consistent with operations at the eval-
uative categorization stage changed as a func-
tion of the pleasantness and unpleasantness of
visual images participants were viewing. Across
two experiments, larger amplitude brain re-
sponses were found when viewing negative ver-
sus positive stimuli. Moreover, this effect oc-
curred despite equating positive and negative
stimuli with respect to probability, evaluative
extremity, and arousal. That there were valance-
related differences at the evaluative categoriza-
tion stage (as opposed to the output stage, for
example) indicates that bad outweighs good at a
motivational level.
Although the evidence has only begun accru-
ing, it suggests that the brain responds more
strongly to bad than good things and that it
retains the memory of bad things, even when
the behavioral response has undergone extinc-
tion. The extinction of a fear response is there-
fore not a genuine case of unlearning, it merely
reflects a behavioral adaptation. The organism
retains the readiness to respond with fear again,
so subsequent relearning of the fear response
would be facilitated. Clearly, this would be an
adaptive pattern insofar as once a threat is rec-
ognized, the person or animal will remember
the threat more or less forever.
Child Development
Fairly little work is available to examine the
relative power of good versus bad events on
child development. An authoritative work by
the eminent developmentalist Scarr (1992) di-
rectly addressed the effects of good versus bad
environments on child development. She pro-
posed that normal development depends on
having an environment that falls within the nor-
mal range. Anything outside that range impairs
development. Scarr cited "violent, abusive, and
neglectful families" (1992, p. 5) as examples of
such environments that can harm child devel-
opment. The thrust of Scarr's argument was that
having exceptionally good parents or a positive
environment would not produce any better de-
velopment than having average parents and an
average environment; whereas having bad par-
ents or a bad environment can inflict lasting
harm. Thus, only the bad, and not the good, can
produce effects that go beyond the average or
normal.
Perhaps the most conclusive data come from
cognitive and intellectual development. It is
fairly well established that intelligence (IQ) is
consistently correlated with social class, as well
as being strongly influenced by genes and he-
redity (e.g., Jensen, 1998). The correlation with
social class can be interpreted as fitting several
different causal hypotheses, and indeed the con-
troversial work by Herrnstein and Murray
(1994) proposed that IQ is a decisive determi-
nant of social class, because low intelligence
leads to lower success in life. Other authors
have, however, emphasized the opposite causal
direction, proposing that social class affects IQ,
either through the good effects of a well-off
family or the harmful effects of growing up in a
poor, disadvantaged environment.
Any effect of rich or poor families has to
overcome the strong genetic contribution to IQ.
Recently, some researchers have begun to ex-
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amine how the relative contributions of nature
and nurture (operationalized in terms of genetic
heredity vs. shared family environment) may
change as a function of social class. This per-
mits a rather precise comparison of whether bad
is stronger than good: Does the family environ-
ment overcome the genetic contribution more
effectively in good or poor families? Put an-
other way, one assumes that children start off
with a genetic blueprint for a certain level of
intelligence, and the crucial questions are
whether good parents can increase their chil-
dren's IQ above that level, whether poor parents
can decrease their children's IQ below that
same level, or both.
The educational level of parents was selected
for investigation by Rowe, Jacobson, and Van
den Oord (1999). Consistent with the view that
bad is stronger than good, they found that the
influence of family educational level (relative to
heredity) was stronger at the low end. More
precisely, the genetic heritability of intelligence
(IQ) was strong and significant among highly
educated families but was weak and nonsignif-
icant among poorly educated families. The ef-
fects of shared environment on children's IQ
showed the complementary pattern, with the
effect of the shared family environment ap-
proaching zero among the highly educated fam-
ilies but having an appreciable and significant
effect among the poorly educated families.
Thus, a relatively poor family environment was
able to overcome the genetic contribution to
intelligence, but the good family environment
had no effect and simply allowed the genes to
determine the children's intelligence. Parents
can make their genetically bright children less
intelligent, but they cannot apparently make
their unintelligent ones (or any others) smarter.
Similar results were obtained in another
study using father's occupational level. Among
the occupationally successful fathers, children's
IQ depended mainly on genetic heredity,
whereas with less successful fathers the family
environment effect was strong and the genetic
contribution was minimal (Thompson, Tiu, &
Detterman, 1999). These findings converge
with those of Rowe et al. (1999) and indicate
that the effects of parenting and other environ-
mental experiences on children are mainly neg-
ative: Bad family environments override the
effect of genetic heredity on intelligence, but
good environments do not—fitting the view that
bad environments are stronger.
Thus, we do not have extensive data compar-
ing good versus bad influences on child devel-
opment, but the available data are methodolog-
ically quite strong because of the research de-
sign that separates environmental from genetic
effects. The evidence is consistent with the view
that bad is stronger than good.
Social Support
Over the past couple decades, the importance
of social support has been established as central
to health and well-being. Social support is usu-
ally defined in terms of emotional bolstering
and practical assistance received from other
people, particularly friends, relatives, and other
relationship partners. Interactions with such in-
dividuals are not invariably positive, however,
and certainly conflict, undermining, and other
detrimental interactions are possible. If bad is
stronger than good, we would predict that these
aversive interactions with relationship partners
will have a stronger impact on health, well-
being, and other outcomes than will positive,
supportive interactions. Given the general thrust
of social support research toward showing pos-
itive, beneficial effects, the social support liter-
ature may be regarded on an a priori basis as a
fairly hostile sphere in which to test the hypoth-
esis about the greater power of bad things.
Various findings have indicated that negative
or upsetting social support weighs more heavily
than positive or helpful social support (e.g.,
Manne, Taylor, Dougherty, & Kemeny, 1997).
One important approach has people furnish sep-
arate ratings of the good and bad behaviors of
the members of their social network (e.g., being
a source of conflict and distress vs. being help-
ful and optimistic). Fiore, Becker, and Coppel
(1983) used this method and found that the
degree to which a person rated his or her net-
work members as upsetting was more predictive
of depression than was the rated degree of
helpfulness.
Similarly, Rook (1984) found that helpful
aspects of the social networks of older widowed
women were generally unrelated to psycholog-
ical adjustment and well-being, but problem-
atic, unhelpful aspects of the widows' networks
were associated with lower levels of adjustment
and well-being, even after controlling for sev-
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eral demographic and health-related variables.
More precisely, the number of interpersonal
problems and the number of people who pro-
vided problematic or confiictual interactions
both predicted (lower) well-being, whereas the
number of sources of positive social support
failed to predict anything (except loneliness,
which seems a trivially obvious effect). Rook
concluded that aversive social interactions have
stronger effects on well-being than positive so-
cial interactions.
Using an older sample of both genders, Okun,
Melichar, and Hill (1990) found stronger (cor-
relational) effects for bad than good social ties
and for bad than good daily events. The bad
aspects of the social network predicted psycho-
logical distress more strongly than the good
aspects. The independent contributions of good
and bad aspects of one's social support network
on people caring for a spouse with Alzheimer's
disease were assessed by Pagel, Erdly, and
Becker (1987) in a 10-month longitudinal study.
They found that positive aspects (such as help-
fulness) were unrelated to depression and social
support satisfaction. Negative aspects such as up-
setting interactions, however, predicted greater
depression and lower satisfaction with the social
network. Even after controlling for initial de-
pression and initial problems, changes in nega-
tive aspects of social support over time pre-
dicted changes in depression.
Similar findings were reported by Finch,
Okun, Barrera, Zautra, and Reich (1989). Their
sample consisted of recently disabled or re-
cently bereaved older adults and a matched con-
trol group. Positive social ties predicted positive
well-being, whereas negative social ties pre-
dicted both well-being and distress.
The effects of social conflict and social sup-
port on coping with abortion were studied by
Major et al. (1997). They concluded that con-
flict in close relationships had a greater impact
than support on postabortion distress, although
support in close relationships had a greater im-
pact on postabortion well-being. These results
fit an affect-matching view (i.e., good things
have an impact on good feelings, whereas bad
things have an impact on bad feelings) rather
than the simpler blanket position that bad is
stronger than good, so their results could be
considered partly contrary to the main thrust
here. Several features of their study prevent it
from serving as powerful contrary evidence,
though. For one, most of the disclosures were
selectively aimed only at people who the
women expected would be supportive: Women
did not disclose the abortion to someone who
was likely to be disapproving, so the range was
severely restricted. Furthermore, the effects
were obtained mainly after controlling for pos-
itive and negative affectivity, and these vari-
ables strongly colored the perception of social
support and conflict. As noted previously, in
terms of pure effects not already adjusted by
valence, negative affectivity had a stronger im-
pact overall than the positive, on both types of
outcomes combined.
Social support and social conflict (undermin-
ing) were examined by Vinokur and van Ryn
(1993) in a sample of people who had lost their
jobs within the past 4 months, with follow-up
questionnaires 2 months and 4 months later.
Independent measures were given for social
support and social conflict or undermining, and
these had been designed to look at behaviors
that would, in principle, have precisely opposite
effects (i.e., restoring vs. diminishing self-
worth). Despite the implicit parallel, the mea-
sures of social conflict and social support were
not opposite ends of a single factor. They were
negatively correlated at about -.70, but were
found to be largely independent factors with
quite different effects on other variables.
Most relevant were the effects on mental
health, which was assessed by measures of anx-
iety and depression scales from a symptom in-
dex. Social conflict or undermining was signif-
icantly related to mental health at all three
times, with correlations growing from .20 at
Time 1 to .47 on the final survey 4 months later.
In contrast, positive social support had a weak
(r = -.20) relation to mental health at Time 1
and even weaker, nonsignificant relationships at
later times. Thus, positive social interactions in
the form of social support had only a weak
effect on mental health, and only at first,
whereas social conflict continued to have a
strong (and, if anything, an increasing) effect on
mental health throughout the period of study.
Vinokur and van Ryn (1993) concluded that bad
interactions are more influential than good ones:
"Interpersonal conflicts that are expressed in
undermining behaviors appear to have a stron-
ger concurrent impact on mental health than
supportive behaviors" (p. 358).
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The separate effects of support and hindrance
from one's social network were studied by
Ruehlman and Wolchik (1988) in a large sam-
ple of undergraduates. They asked participants
to choose the three adults who were most im-
portant to them in their current life situation and
to report the degree to which these individuals
supported and hindered the four most important
personal projects and goals in the participant's
current life. The researchers found that support
and hindrance were largely independent, and
indeed the correlations between support and
hindrance by the same person ranged from .00
to .11. They found that project hindrance pre-
dicted both well-being (i.e., positive psycholog-
ical functioning) and distress (negative psycho-
logical functioning). Project support, on the
other hand, predicted only well-being. Although
their findings represent only cross-sectional cor-
relations, and causal interpretation is therefore
necessarily speculative, these findings do point
toward the same conclusion that bad events
have more pervasive effects than good events.
These results also fit the broader pattern in
which bad events affect both good and bad
outcomes, whereas good events only affect
good outcomes.
The role of social support versus social con-
flict or undermining was studied in relation to
several different sources of support by Abbey,
Abramis, and Caplan (1985). With regard to the
person closest to the respondent, bad was
clearly stronger than good: Social conflict was
related to three of the four measures of well-
being, whereas social support did not correlate
significantly with any of them. Likewise, when
participants reported on support and conflict
from "some one person," conflict predicted with
more (four) indices of well-being, whereas sup-
port predicted only one. For the vaguest cate-
gory, however, social support versus conflict
with people in general, both support and conflict
predicted well-being on almost all of the mea-
sures. These results suggest that bad is stronger
than good when considering particular and im-
portant individuals, but across the broadly non-
specific social network, bad and good social
relations were about equally important.
Supportive and negative interactions with
spouses, friends, and relatives were also exam-
ined by Schuster, Kessler, and Aseltine (1990).
Both types of interactions had effects on emo-
tional functioning (measured in terms of a
checklist for depressive symptoms). Compari-
son of the trends however suggested that the
negative interactions had a stronger effect.
Taken together, thus these studies suggest
that helpful aspects of one's social network bear
little or no relation to depression, well-being,
and social support satisfaction, while upsetting
or unhelpful aspects do. Some findings fit an
affect-matching view, in which positive interac-
tions predict positive outcomes whereas nega-
tive interactions predict negative ones. Even in
those findings, however, there appears to be an
asymmetry: Bad interactions have stronger,
more pervasive, and longer lasting effects.
Information Processing
The extent of information processing is an
important indicator of power and importance.
High motivation and pragmatic concerns cause
people to process relevant information more
thoroughly (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Insofar
as people are cognitive misers, they cannot af-
ford to process all information to an equally full
extent, so they must prioritize their cognitive
resources and focus on what is important. If bad
is generally stronger than good, then informa-
tion pertaining to bad events should receive
more thorough processing than information
about good events. The greater information pro-
cessing may be reflected in paying more atten-
tion to them and in elaborating them more thor-
oughly or constructing more extensive cogni-
tive interpretations (such as attributions). The
more extensive processing will also tend to lead
to enhanced memory for bad material, although
this tendency may sometimes be offset if the
main goal and thrust of the processing involve
defensive responses that retroactively minimize
the bad events and thus conspire to erase them
from memory (cf. Taylor, 1991).
Early evidence that bad things get more
thought was provided by Klinger, Barta, and
Maxeiner (1980). On a self-report scale, people
claimed to devote more thought to their goals
that were blocked than to other categories (in-
cluding positive things). Threatened personal
relationships and projects that had encountered
unexpected difficulties topped the list of most
frequent topics of thought.
The quantity of cognition in response to var-
ious interpersonal events was studied by Abele
(1985). People engaged in more thinking and
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reasoning about bad than good events. A further
and noteworthy feature of Abele's research is
that she also explicitly manipulated whether the
event was expected or unexpected. This vari-
able yielded its own main effect (unexpected
events produced more cognitions), but it did not
interact with valence. Thus, bad events elicit
more processing than good events, even when
the expectedness of the event is held constant.
This suggests that the greater power of bad
cannot be reduced to expectancy effects, con-
trary to one of the theories we have proposed.
Quantity (duration) of cognitive processing
was measured by Fiske (1980), who showed
people photographs of various behaviors that
varied in positivity versus negativity. The os-
tensible purpose of the photographs was to form
impressions. Participants spent longer viewing
the photographs depicting negative than posi-
tive behaviors, suggesting that people paid more
attention to bad than good acts when forming
impressions.
More generally, it is generally assumed that
people seek to understand events that happen to
them, and attributional processing is part of this
search for meaning (e.g., Baumeister, 1991;
Frankl, 1963; Taylor, 1983). To find meaning,
people can try to find a cause that provides them
with an answer to the question as to why certain
events happened or they can try to find a dif-
ferent interpretation and reframe their experi-
ences. Some evidence suggests that negative
events cause people to engage in greater search
for meaning and making sense than positive
events. Baumeister concluded from a broad re-
view that unpleasant events stimulate the need
for meaning to a greater degree than positive or
pleasant events. An empirical test of the differ-
ence was conducted by Gilovich (1983), who
examined spontaneous thinking about important
outcomes. Participants in his study first placed
bets on sporting events and either lost or won
money. About 1 week after the event took place,
they came back into the laboratory to settle their
bets with the experimenter. They also provided
tape-recorded accounts of their current thoughts
about the games. The amount of time spent
discussing the game was greater for the lost
games than for the winning games. This differ-
ence reflects a greater search for meaning for
bad than for good outcomes.
A similar conclusion emerged from a review
of 17 studies on causal attribution by Weiner
(1985). Spontaneous attributional activity was
defined as people's efforts to explain what is
happening to them and to identify a cause for
what happened. In all studies in which positive
events were contrasted with negative ones,
spontaneous attributional activity was greater
for negative (e.g., failures) than for positive
events (e.g., successes).
Pratto and John (1991) set out to test whether
attentional resources are automatically directed
away from the current task when extraneous
stimuli, either good or bad, are presented. Using
a modified Stroop paradigm, the researchers
presented participants with personality trait ad-
jectives (e.g., sadistic, honest), and participants
were instructed to name the color ink in which
each word was printed. To the extent that atten-
tion was automatically seized by the meaning of
the trait, participants would be slower to name
the color. In the first study, people took longer
to name the ink color when the word referred to
a bad trait than when it was a good trait. Thus,
the meanings of bad traits had greater power for
attracting attention, as compared with good
traits. Retrospective self-reports indicated that
participants claimed they ignored the words and
concentrated on the colors, which is consistent
with the view that any interference occurred at
an automatic and not a fully conscious level.
In a second study, Pratto and John (1991)
replicated the greater interference by bad than
good traits and also showed that people had
greater memory for the bad than for the good
traits: Participants were twice as likely to re-
member the bad ones than the good ones. This
suggests that the automatic shifting of attention
to the bad traits stimulated some incidental
learning, resulting in the superior recall. In a
third study, Pratto and John replicated the ef-
fects despite explicitly varying the base rates of
good and bad traits, in order to rule out the
hypothesis that bad information is stronger sim-
ply because it is more unusual. The manipula-
tion of base rates (i.e., whether the stimulus set
contained more good or more bad traits in total)
was not significant, whereas the valence imbal-
ance remained significant across different base
rates. The authors concluded that bad informa-
tion, at least in the form of undesirable trait
terms, has more power than good information
for attracting attention in an automatic, nonin-
tentional fashion, and that this effect is not due
to greater informativeness of diagnosticity
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(based on generally positive expectations and
base rates).
The greater attention to bad than good was
shown in a different way by Graziano, Brothen,
and Berscheid (1980). Participants received ei-
ther a positive or a negative evaluation from
another person. They viewed the other person's
evaluation on videotape. Across conditions, all
participants monitored the negative evaluation
video for significantly more time (56% of the
total time) than the positive evaluation video
(44% of the total time). This difference was
more pronounced when participants expected to
interact with the other person as compared with
when participants did not expect any future
interaction.
Attention to emotionally expressive faces
was studied by Oehman, Lundqvist, and Es-
teves (2001). Schematically drawn faces were
presented in groups, and some of them had
either a happy smiling face or a threatening,
frowning face. Threatening faces were detected
more quickly and accurately than the smiling
faces under most conditions. A no-difference
result was obtained under one condition (in-
volving a background matrix of friendly faces
and a short processing time), but overall the
frowning faces were noticed better.
Another sign of the attentional priority of bad
over good was furnished by Marshall and Kidd
(1981), who conducted a series of studies ask-
ing whether participants preferred to hear good
or bad news first, provided that both were forth-
coming. Across several studies, they found a
strong majority consistently (from 77% to 88%)
asked to hear the bad news first. The greater
processing of bad than good events was shown
by Holtzworth-Munroe and Jacobson (1985) in
the context of marital relationships. Participants
generated lists of positive and negative events,
frequent and infrequent, that were occurring in
their marriage. They were then presented with
various items from the list in random order and
asked to list their thoughts and feelings that
would occur if each event were happening right
now. The aversive partner behaviors, regardless
of whether frequent or infrequent, led to more
attributional activity than positive partner
behaviors.
The issue is somewhat more complicated in
reactions to other people's emotion displays.
Krull and Dill (1998) found that participants
made more spontaneous trait inferences from
other participant's happy rather than sad behav-
ior. They speculated, however, that sad behav-
ior can result from a variety of causes, so it is
complex and not sufficiently unambiguous (di-
agnostic) to permit a spontaneous inference. In
support of this conclusion, Krull and Dill re-
ported that participants were significantly
slower at making either inferences about the
causes of sad behavior as compared with happy
behavior. The slower reaction time is consistent
with the general theme of greater processing
with regard to negative than positive informa-
tion. In plain terms, people can make snap judg-
ments about someone who seems happy, but
they engage in longer and more complex (but
less conclusive) thinking about someone who
seems sad.
The longer time taken for the attributions
about negative behaviors may be related to the
greater specificity of negative traits. Claeys and
Timmers (1993) found that bad traits are more
specifically and narrowly defined than good
traits, in the sense that the bad traits are seen as
more different from each other and encompass a
narrower range of behaviors. The greater spec-
ificity of bad traits may be a linguistic sign of
the greater power or importance of bad than
good, parallel to the preponderance of words for
bad than good emotions.
There is also some evidence that affective
consequences of negative information are stron-
ger than those of good information. Ikegami
(1993) primed people by having them write
first-person sentences containing friendly, hos-
tile, or neutral words. The hostile priming had
stronger and longer lasting effects on subse-
quent emotional states than either the positive or
the neutral primes.
Some apparent exceptions may be found in
the special category of bad feedback about the
self, which people are motivated to avoid.
Baumeister and Cairns (1992) found that repres-
sors devoted less processing time to unfavor-
able personality feedback, under some condi-
tions. The tendency to avoid bad feedback prob-
ably does not indicate any lack of strength on
the part of the individual, however. More likely,
it reflects a tendency to want to shield the self
from the negative impact (such as potential loss
of self-esteem). Even in this work, moreover,
bad information did receive exceptionally long
processing when it could not easily be dis-
missed and avoided, so even the apparent ex-
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ception to the general pattern was found under
only limited conditions.
The more extensive and elaborate processing
of bad than good material has been amply con-
firmed in practical contexts outside of the lab-
oratory, too. Among journalists and communi-
cation scientists, it is considered common
knowledge that bad events are more newswor-
thy and attract more reader attention. Periodic
calls for the news to focus more on positive,
uplifting stories get nowhere, not because jour-
nalists are sadists or misanthropes, but because
bad news sells more papers. Likewise, Fiedler's
(1966/1982) authoritative history of novels in-
cluded the pointed observation that no one has
ever been able to make a successful novel about
a happy marriage, whereas marital problems
have filled countless novels. Thus, the most
widely read classes of writers—journalists and
novelists—both devote the bulk of their writing
to elaborating bad rather than good events.
Thus, bad information does receive more thor-
ough information processing than good infor-
mation. Bad information is more likely to seize
attention, and it receives more conscious pro-
cessing as well. The one exception to this gen-
eral rule involves unflattering information about
the self that some individuals such as repressors
may simply avoid.
Memory
Memory should be most subject to a positiv-
ity bias, in view of the minimization processes
that selectively erase bad memories (Taylor,
1991) and other repressive processes. Yet even
with memory, there is some evidence that bad is
stronger than good, although this effect is
bounded by self-enhancement processes and
mood-congruent recall processes.
Interviews with children and adults up to 50
years old (in separate studies) about childhood
memories found a preponderance of unpleasant
memories, even among people who rated their
childhoods as having been relatively pleasant
and happy (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1968).
Likewise, superior recall for unfavorable in-
formation was shown by Dreben, Fiske, and
Hastie (1979). Regardless of serial position,
sentences describing people's undesirable be-
haviors were recalled better than sentences de-
scribing desirable or neutral behaviors. The su-
perior memory for bad than for good things was
also found by Bless et al. (1992). Participants
remembered bad behaviors better than good
ones. Skowronski and Carlston (1987) also
found that bad behaviors were recalled better
than good ones, for both extreme and moderate
levels.
On the other hand, biases that flatter the self
make recall of one's own bad behaviors less
likely. Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, and Shan-
non (1991) explicitly compared memory for
everyday life events for both the self and for
another person such as a friend whom the par-
ticipant saw almost every day. They found no
difference in recall for the friend's pleasant
versus unpleasant events, but for the self there
was a memory bias in favor of the pleasant
events (although this was limited to events with
intermediate typicality; typical and atypical
events were recalled better, regardless of pleas-
antness). These findings suggest that there are
certain memory biases that downplay bad expe-
riences of the self but not of other people,
consistent with Taylor's (1991) minimization
hypothesis.
Also supportive of a motivation to minimize
negative events are the findings from a study in
which the researchers examined whether recol-
lection of the emotional intensity of a personal
event changed as a function on time and initial
positivity or negativity of the event (Walker,
Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). Walker et al. as-
sessed participants' evaluations of personal ex-
periences—both positive and negative—as they
occurred and then reassessed their evaluations
of these experiences at intervals of 3 months, 1
year, and 4.5 years. Consistent with previous
findings (e.g., Holmes, 1970), they found that
the affective intensity of a memory fades as
time progressed and that this effect was espe-
cially true for memories of negative events.
That is, the drop in intensity was steeper for
memories of negative, compared with positive,
events. Notably, the content of the memories
remained intact over time. The researchers in-
terpreted this finding as indicating that people
effortfully target the emotional intensity of neg-
ative events, hoping to diminish their subse-
quent influence (see Taylor, 1991).
Cognitive psychologists have examined
whether bad items are processed and remem-
bered better than positive ones. Robinson-
Riegler and Winton (1996) confirmed that par-
ticipants showed better recognition memory for
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negative than positive items. Furthermore, they
were better able to recall the source of bad than
good information, as shown by their ability to
identify which stimuli had come to them in a
second as opposed to a first phase; whereas the
positive stimuli seemed simply to get all mixed
together. These findings suggest that the bad
material received more thorough processing
when it was encoded and was, therefore, re-
tained in a more complex, elaborate memory
trace.
Ohira, Winton, and Oyama (1997) extended
Robinson-Riegler and Winton's work by in-
cluding measures of eyeblinks and latency, both
of which have been associated with increased
conscious processing. They too found that par-
ticipants remembered (recognized) negative
words more successfully than positive words.
The negative words were also associated with
slower responses and more eyeblinks, both of
which indicate greater conscious processing.
These findings fit the view that negative mate-
rial evokes more extensive conscious activity,
which in turn produces better memory for the
material.
In contrast, there is evidence for mood-con-
gruent recall for semantic material (for a re-
view, see Matt, Vasquez, & Campbell, 1992).
Nondepressed individuals show a bias toward
recalling positively valenced stimulus words;
depressed individuals recall equal numbers of
positively valenced and negatively valenced
stimulus words.
In summary, three psychological forces ap-
pear to collide in the human memory. The mem-
ory literature does supply limited evidence for
the greater power of bad over good, but this
does not appear to be the dominant force. This
evidence coexists with a tendency for individu-
als to recall positive information (a self-en-
hancement effect), particularly when in a posi-
tive mood (a mood-congruent recall effect).
This is true for self-relevant memories and se-
mantic recall.
Stereotypes
A generalization about a category or group of
people can in principle be either good or bad.
Although undoubtedly some stereotypes are fa-
vorable, the majority of them appear to be neg-
ative and pejorative. This suggests that the pro-
cess of forming and maintaining stereotypes is
biased toward negativity, which would be yet
another sign that bad is stronger than good.
One important source of stereotype formation
and persistence is illusory correlation based on
distinctive events. A meta-analytic review of 23
studies on this pattern was conducted by Mullen
and Johnson (1990). They found that distinctive
negative behaviors have stronger effects, in the
sense of being better able to generate illusory
correlations, than distinctive positive behaviors
or neutral behaviors. In particular, minority
groups (which are already salient by virtue of
minority status) are likely to be assigned unde-
sirable stereotypes based on illusory correlations.
One important sign of differential power
would be the relative ease with which stereo-
types are formed and disconfirmed, as a func-
tion of whether the stereotype is favorable or
unfavorable. Rothbart and Park (1986) found
strong correlations between the favorability of a
trait and the number of instances required for its
confirmation (r = .71) and discontinuation (r =
-.70). Specifically, the more unfavorable the
trait, the fewer the number of instances required
for confirmation and the greater the number of
instances necessary for disconfirmation.
In other words, bad reputations are easy to
acquire but difficult to lose, whereas good rep-
utations are difficult to acquire but easy to lose.
These findings suggest that unfavorable charac-
teristics once acquired as part of a stereotype
may be difficult to lose in part because a large
number of observations are necessary for their
disconfirmation. The findings certainly confirm
that bad is stronger than good: It takes far more
to overcome the bad than the good trait, and
more to change the bad than the good
reputation.
Forming Impressions
Impression formation is one of the few topics
with which researchers have recognized and
discussed a general pattern of valence imbal-
ance (e.g., Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). The
usual term is positive—negative asymmetry, in-
dicating that bad information about a stimulus
person or new acquaintance carries more weight
and has a larger impact on impressions than
good information (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski,
1990).
An early demonstration of this asymmetry
was provided by Anderson (1965), who pre-
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sumably hoped for different findings because he
was trying to advance an additive and averaging
model of impression formation. That is, he
sought to show that people form impressions of
someone by adding up and averaging all of the
information they have about that person, good
and bad alike.
To support his averaging model, Anderson
(1965) provided participants with various per-
sonality traits that allegedly characterized a
stimulus person. These traits had been given
precise weights based on favorability ratings, so
he carefully chose positive and negative traits
that were equally distant from the neutral point
on the favorability scale. The participants were
then asked to rate their overall impression of the
stimulus person. Anderson could then investi-
gate how these global impressions departed
from the midpoint of the scale as a function of
how the various traits departed from the favor-
ability midpoint. He found that the bad trait
adjectives were stronger than the good ones.
The mean ratings of stimulus persons defined by
all negative traits departed farther from the
global scale midpoint than did the mean ratings
of stimulus persons defined by all positive traits,
even though the traits were equally distant from
the midpoint. Furthermore, when stimulus per-
sons were described with both favorable and
unfavorable traits, the unfavorable ones lowered
the global impression rating more than a simple
additive or averaging model would predict, un-
like the favorable traits, which did not exert an
influence beyond averaging. Anderson con-
cluded that unfavorable trait adjectives were
more powerful than favorable ones in shaping
impressions.
Another early demonstration was provided
by Feldman (1966; see also discussion in
Wright, 1991), who was also interested in av-
eraging models. Participants in his study pro-
vided ratings of stimulus persons who had been
described with one positive, one negative, or
one of each type of adjective. The overall rat-
ings of people described by both positive and
negative labels were more negative than a sim-
ple averaging of impressions would have pre-
dicted: Thus, the bad information carried more
weight. Wyer and Hinkle (1971) likewise found
that bad information carried more weight in
impression formation than in good information.
Similar findings were provided by Hodges
(1974). Participants in his study rated pairs of
traits, and Hodges then calculated whether the
combined impression deviated from the average
of the two traits. A pure averaging model suc-
cessfully predicted impressions when only both
traits were positive. In all others, the more neg-
ative trait carried greater weight. Thus, even
when both traits were negative, the total impres-
sion was more negative than a simple averaging
of the two traits would predict. Of course, when
the traits were one of each, the bad one carried
more weight. Thus, bad information consis-
tently had a stronger effect on the final
impression.
Hamilton and Huffman (1971) also found
that undesirable traits received more weight in
impression formation than did desirable ones.
The authors explained this on the basis of dis-
tinctive usefulness of information: Because
good behavior is common and expected, bad
things are more revealing and hence more im-
portant to know. Hamilton and Zanna (1972)
found that negative traits exerted a stronger
effect than positive traits on impressions, as
shown by greater departure from the mean rat-
ings of neutral targets. Moreover, negative traits
had a stronger effect than positive traits on
participants' confidence in their impressions.
That is, raters were more confident of the accu-
racy of their bad impression of someone with
bad traits than they were confident about their
good impression of someone with good traits.
Taken together, these findings show that bad
information has greater power both objectively
and subjectively. The objective power is shown
in the stronger effect on the impression, and the
subjective power is shown in the greater confi-
dence in the accuracy of the impression.
Evidence that negative information carries
more weight than positive information in terms
of influence on likeability was provided by
Fiske (1980). She showed photographs depict-
ing various behaviors that differed in valence
(i.e., positive or negative) and extremity. Neg-
ative behaviors had more impact on likeability
than positive information, especially when the
level of extremity was high. The greater power
of bad information than good information has
continued to be found in recent work (e.g.,
Vonk, 1993, 1996, 1999; Vonk & Knippenberg,
1994).
The greater power of bad than good informa-
tion can also be seen in speed of decision mak-
ing and the amount of information sought. Yzer-
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byt and Ley ens (1991) had participants make
decisions about whether a given actor was
suited to play a theatre role that was described
as likeable or unlikable. Participants were told
how much total information was available about
each actor and were given this information a
little at a time, so they were free to make a
decision as soon as they felt confident enough to
do so. The greater impact of negative trait in-
formation was shown in speedier decisions (i.e.,
with less information): A little evidence that the
actor was unlikable was enough to discredit him
or her for the likeable role. In contrast, a small
amount of evidence that an actor was likeable
was not enough to disqualify him or her for the
unlikable role. (That is, with the unlikable role,
the difference was eliminated but not signifi-
cantly reversed.) When initial information was
favorable but unfavorable information followed
it (with the likeable role), participants shifted
strongly and quickly to rejecting the candidate,
which again shows a disproportionately strong
impact of bad traits. In general, then, people
made faster decisions with less information
when they were given negative rather than pos-
itive information.
The evidence and theories about the positive-
negative asymmetry were reviewed by Skow-
ronski and Carlston (1989). These authors also
put forward their own theory, based on category
diagnosticity (see also Czapinski, 1986). The
basic assumptions of their theory were, first,
that people categorize other individuals by us-
ing available informational cues. Second, peo-
ple see some behaviors as more helpful than
others in discriminating between various trait
categorizations. In other words, some behaviors
are more informative than others. For example,
the behavior of stealing is more informative
about someone's honesty than is the behavior of
running. This usefulness of behaviors for mak-
ing such judgments is what Skowronski and
Carlston meant by category diagnosticity.
Third, attributes perceived as more diagnostic
for category membership will be more influen-
tial in impression formation than others. Fourth,
and most relevant, extreme or negative behav-
iors are perceived as more diagnostic than mod-
erate or positive behaviors.
Why should this be so? Skowronski and Carl-
ston (1989) proposed that bad behaviors are
more diagnostic than good ones simply because
the category requirements of consistency are
more stringent for good than bad traits. To be
categorized as good, one has to be good all of
the time (consistently). To be categorized as
bad, a few bad acts are sufficient, and presum-
ably hardly anyone is consistently bad. Hence,
negative behaviors carry more weight than pos-
itive behaviors for ruling out some categories.
The diagnosticity view was tested in a later
paper by Skowronski and Carlston (1992). They
noted that to be morally good means to be
always good, whereas immorality does not re-
quire consistent immorality, so single immoral
behaviors are more diagnostic. For example,
one may be regarded as a liar despite telling the
truth on many occasions, but one will not be
regarded as an honest man if he tells many lies.
The opposite may apply to intelligence, how-
ever, because a stupid person can never be
brilliant, whereas a very intelligent person can
occasionally do a stupid thing. Skowronski and
Carlston did find that the negativity bias held
true for moral behaviors but was reversed for
intelligence-related behaviors: Extremely posi-
tive (intelligent) acts had a bigger effect than
extremely negative ones.
The greater power of bad in the sphere of
moral behavior was the focus of Riskey and
Birnbaum (1974) in an article with the revealing
subtitle, "Two Rights Don't Make Up for a
Wrong." They found that morally bad actions
create a powerful effect on overall judgment,
and this effect is only slightly mitigated by
adding morally good actions. Riskey and Birn-
baum's conclusion was "the overall goodness of
a person is determined mostly by his worst bad
deed, with good deeds having lesser influ-
ence. . . . Given a person has done evil, an
infinite number of good deeds may not produce
a favorable overall impression" (p. 172). Skow-
ronski and Carlston (1992) found that the im-
pression impact of morally good behaviors was
easily overridden by new information depicting
immoral behaviors, but the reverse did not hold:
An initial impression based on morally bad be-
haviors was not easily changed by new infor-
mation about morally good behaviors.
Some researchers have pointed out that in
certain domains, positive information should
carry more weight. Skowronski and Carlston
(1987) contended that diagnosticity helps pre-
dict differential weighting of information as a
function of whether the judgment pertains to
morality or competence. With morality, bad
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acts are more diagnostic because only immoral
people do bad things, whereas both moral and
immoral people do good things. With ability,
however, good performances should be more
diagnostic than bad ones because only compe-
tent people achieve superior performances,
whereas both competent and incompetent peo-
ple can perform badly. Their findings confirmed
a negativity bias with moral traits (e.g., dishon-
est behaviors influenced impressions more than
honest ones) but a positivity bias with traits
based on competence (e.g., intelligent behaviors
had a stronger effect than stupid ones). The
dependent variable in these studies was the par-
ticipant's estimate that the stimulus person
would act a certain way in the future, which
differs from simply giving a subjective judg-
ment of favorability or likeability. Thus, the
results indicate mainly that having performed
well (i.e., competently) leads to stronger predic-
tions about future performance than having per-
formed badly, whereas having acted immorally
leads to stronger predictions about future per-
formance than having acted morally.
Similar results were reported by Martijn,
Spears, van der Pligt, and Jakobs (1992), but
with an added twist that they surveyed the net
effect of various combinations on overall im-
pressions. The global impression was more af-
fected by bad behaviors than good ones, regard-
less of whether the information referred to abil-
ity or morality. That is, Martijn et al. examined
various combinations of traits (e.g., morally in-
corruptible plus clever, incorruptible plus stu-
pid, corrupt plus clever, and corrupt plus stupid)
and assessed overall impressions. All of the
combinations, except the double-positive condi-
tion, were more negative than a simple averag-
ing model would have predicted. Thus, any bad
information carried a disproportionately stron-
ger impact than any good information. Another
way of describing their results is that they rep-
licated the diagnosticity effect but also showed
that the greater power of bad than good infor-
mation goes beyond issues of diagnosticity.
Hiring and personnel decisions constitute an
especially important sphere of impression for-
mation, and it is one in which situational con-
tingencies probably underscore the greater im-
portance of bad information: It may be more
costly to hire a bad, undesirable employee than
to reject a good, desirable one. Bolster and
Springbett (1961) studied how interviewers'
opinions changed as a function of new good or
bad information about a candidate. Across a
variety of measures and procedures, they found
consistently that bad information exerted a
more powerful effect than good information.
For example, if the initial judgment favored
hiring (i.e., acceptance), only 3.8 unfavorable
bits of information were required to shift the
decision to rejection; whereas 8.8 favorable
pieces of information were necessary to shift an
initially negative decision toward acceptance.
Likewise, Webster (1964) concluded that per-
sonnel interviewers use unfavorable informa-
tion as a basis for rejecting candidates to a
greater extent than they use favorable informa-
tion as a basis for hiring them. Webster sug-
gested that it was more common (and hence
presumably required less information) to
change from a favorable to an unfavorable im-
pression of a candidate than to change from
unfavorable to favorable.
The influence of speaking with positive ver-
sus negative words on impressions was studied
by Berry, Pennebaker, Mueller, and Hiller
(1997). They instructed one set of participants
to "tell us about yourself and what is going on
in your life," and they videotaped these
speeches. The tapes were then shown to other
participants, who rated each one on several di-
mensions. Berry et al. found that people used far
more positive than negative emotion words in
their self-disclosures (consistent with the view
that positive things outnumber bad things), but
the negative emotion words had significantly
more impact on impressions. Specifically, the
more people used negative emotion words, the
less warm/likable and the less competent they
were judged to be. Positive emotion words had
no significant impact on either type of rating
and, in fact, on ratings of dominance, positive
emotion words actually had a negative effect.
Berry et al. speculated that the reason for the
discrepancy is that it is acceptable and even
expected for people to discuss positive feelings
during a first encounter, but speaking about
negative feelings is not expected and generates
a stronger reaction.
Thus, the greater power of bad than good
information in forming impressions has been
well documented and recognized by research-
ers. Multiple theories have been put forward to
address this asymmetry, including expectations,
memory, and category diagnosticity. Although
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these theories can each explain a substantial
amount of the findings, the greater power of bad
than good information appears to survive even
when these explanations do not apply.
Self
Self-concepts should seemingly be one
sphere in which bad is not stronger than good. It
is well recognized that most people hold rather
favorable opinions of themselves. Taylor and
Brown (1988) documented a substantial amount
of evidence indicating that people think more
favorably of themselves than objective evidence
warrants (see also Greenwald, 1980). Baumeis-
ter, Tice, and Hutton (1989) showed that self-
esteem scores on all different scales tend to be
distributed from very high to medium, with
hardly any participants scoring in the truly low
self-esteem range. Other reviews have con-
firmed that implausibly high majorities of peo-
ple consider themselves to be above average on
various dimensions (see Gilovich, 1991). If bad
performances carried greater weight in forming
self-concepts, then presumably most people
would regard themselves as below average
rather than above.
Yet perhaps a direct prediction that people
would have unfavorable self-concepts is unre-
alistic. It is generally agreed that people have
strong motivations to maintain favorable con-
cepts of themselves (e.g., Banaji & Prentice,
1994; Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides, 1993).
Hence, it is likely that they exert themselves to
prevent bad information and bad experiences
from producing an unfavorable self-concept.
Thus, bad information could actually have
greater power than good, without necessarily
resulting in a bad self-concept—provided that
people's responses to bad experiences or threat-
ening information are capable of discounting
any implications about the self. This was a
central thrust of Taylor's (1991) paper, which
recognized the power of bad feedback but pro-
posed that minimization processes selectively
discredit and erase the negative implications for
self.
These arguments suggest a way to reformu-
late the question of whether bad is stronger than
good with respect to the self. The strong moti-
vation to have a good rather than a bad opinion
of self can be decomposed into two strivings:
one of which is to avoid a bad opinion of self
(self-protection), and the other is to gain a good
opinion of self (self-enhancement). If bad is
stronger than good, then the self-protective mo-
tivation should be stronger than the self-en-
hancement one.
Self-concept theory has traditionally placed
more emphasis on self-enhancement than on
self-protection, such as embodied in the concept
of the ideal self (a positive view of self) that is
seen as the main motivator. Ogilvie (1987) sur-
veyed psychology students and faculty as to
whether life satisfaction depended more on be-
coming like their ideal selves or becoming un-
like their undesired selves, and nearly 90% of
both students and faculty said the desire to meet
one's positive ideals was stronger. Yet Ogil-
vie's own data pointed strongly in the opposite
direction: The undesired self (operationally de-
fined as "How I hope never to be") was a more
powerful motivator than the desired self. Gen-
eral satisfaction in life had significant correla-
tions with both closeness to the ideal self and
closeness to the undesired self, but the latter
was significantly higher (for ideal self, r = .368;
for undesired self, r = -.719). Regression anal-
yses suggested that the motivation to approach
one's ideals might even be derivative of the
motivation to avoid becoming one's undesired
self. Ogilvie suggested that many people form
their ideals precisely in response to their unde-
sired selves. For example, Ogilvie described 1
participant who said his most undesired self was
to be dependent, needy, and selfish and who
correspondingly erected ideals for himself to be
unselfishly helpful to others. "It is likely that his
ideal self was derived from his undesired self
and not vice versa, and it is suspected that this
is the normal course of events" (Ogilvie, 1987,
p. 384).
The distinction between protection and en-
hancement was also made by Baumeister et al.
(1989) with regard to individual differences in
self-esteem and self-presentational motivations.
They concluded that people with low self-es-
teem are primarily concerned with self-protec-
tion, consistent with the view of the greater
power of bad events. In contrast, however,
Baumeister et al. concluded that people with
high self-esteem are oriented toward self-en-
hancement, which seemingly suggests the op-
posite motivational pattern (of greater concern
with good than bad). Yet the self-enhancement
orientation of people with high self-esteem does
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not actually indicate an indifference to bad out-
comes or failure. If anything, people with high
self-esteem show even more dramatic and strik-
ing responses to failure than people with low
self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1985;
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; McFar-
lin & Blascovich, 1981). The difference appears
to be that people with high self-esteem do not
worry much about failure or rejection because
they do not expect these to happen. Their highly
favorable expectations account for the surpris-
ing discrepancy between seeming disregard of
possible future failure and strong and distraught
reactions when they actually receive failure
feedback (Blaine & Crocker, 1993).
The distribution of self-esteem scores may be
relevant. As Baumeister et al. (1989) noted,
participants scoring above the median in self-
esteem do actually have high self-esteem scores
in an absolute sense, so it is plausible that they
do not spend much time worrying about possi-
ble bad outcomes. In contrast, participants scor-
ing below the median (thus low in self-esteem)
typically have scores that are medium in self-
esteem, in absolute terms, indicating that they
have roughly comparable familiarity with suc-
cess and failure. Thus, when both success and
failure are familiar, bad is stronger than good,
and only the people who rarely encounter fail-
ure (according to their belief and perception,
anyway) disdain self-protection.
A direct test of the relative power of the two
motivations was undertaken by Tice (1991).
She used the motivated pattern of self-handi-
capping, a strategic behavior that consists of
creating obstacles to one's own performance,
such as inadequate practice or alcohol impair-
ment (Jones & Berglas, 1978). In principle,
self-handicapping can both enhance success
(e.g., succeeding despite minimal practice is
doubly impressive) and protect against failure
(e.g., failing after inadequate practice is no dis-
grace). Although Tice's findings confirmed the
general hypothesis that low self-esteem people
would self-handicap for self-protection while
high self-esteem people would do it for self-
enhancement, the self-protection pattern was
stronger overall. For example, the self-protec-
tive benefits of self-handicapping were en-
dorsed by participants at both high and low
levels of self-esteem, whereas the self-enhanc-
ing benefits were endorsed only by participants
with high self-esteem. Put another way, every-
one recognizes the value of self-handicapping
for protecting against bad outcomes, whereas
the value for enhancing good outcomes is con-
fined to people with high self-esteem (who do
not worry much about failure anyway). The
more widespread appeal of self-protection is
consistent with the view that bad is stronger
than good.
Likewise, self-serving biases can operate ei-
ther to protect against bad outcomes or to en-
hance good ones, but, again, some evidence
points to greater power and pervasiveness of
self-protection, suggesting that people are more
motivated to avoid the bad than to embrace the
good. Distortion of information in a self-serving
bias was studied by Klein (1992), and he found
that biases were stronger in connection with bad
than good things. In an initial pair of studies,
students were asked to estimate how often they
engaged in positive health-related behaviors
(e.g., eating fruit, brushing teeth, and eating
vitamins) and negative health-related behaviors
(e.g., sunbathing, driving in bad weather, and
eating salty foods). They also estimated how
often their peers performed the same behaviors.
There was ample evidence of self-serving bias:
On average, students estimated that they per-
formed the good acts more often, and the bad
acts less often, than their peers. For present
purposes, the relevant point is that Klein found
greater bias in connection with the bad than the
good behaviors. In fact, in the second study, the
bias (i.e., the difference between self and peer
estimates) reached significance for the bad be-
haviors but not for the good ones. In a third
study, Klein used the same behavior (eating
raisins) and presented it as either a healthful or
an unhealthful behavior. When it was presented
as health enhancing, because of the high vita-
min content of raisins, students claimed to eat
more raisins than their peers, but when it was
presented as unhealthful, because of a high sul-
fur content of raisins, students estimated that
they ate fewer raisins than their peers. (Control
participants, for whom eating raisins was not
presented as either healthful or unhealthful,
showed no bias either way.) For present pur-
poses, the most relevant finding was that the
positive bias was weaker than the negative bias.
All these findings point to the conclusion that
avoiding the bad is a stronger motivation than
embracing the good.
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More generally, people seem to show more
self-favoring biases for negative than for posi-
tive behaviors. Hoorens (1996) reviewed multi-
ple studies showing this pattern, which is to say
that people seek to avoid bad traits more than
they seek to claim good traits. Hoorens's (1995)
earlier work found a contrary pattern, in which
participants claimed to possess more good and
fewer bad traits than the average person, so the
effect is not unanimous, but the contrary find-
ings are often confounded. Thus, Hoorens's
(1995) results were confounded by differential
base rates: The rates of endorsement of bad
traits were relatively low for both self and the
average person, so there was relatively little
statistical room for the denial of bad traits to
emerge.
Personal optimism was also studied by Hoo-
rens (1995) by having participants rate the rel-
ative likelihood that various positive and nega-
tive events would happen to them, as opposed to
being likely to happen to the average person of
their same age, sex, and school. The motiva-
tional bias fit the view that bad is stronger than
good: Hoorens found that personal optimism
was more pronounced with regard to bad events
than good events. In other words, participants
underestimated their own chances of having
various bad experiences (relative to the average
person) more strongly than they overestimated
their chances of having various good experiences.
In performance settings, self-enhancement
and self-protection are often indistinguishable.
Doing one's best accomplishes both the goal of
avoiding failure and securing success. Only a
few studies have effectively sought to separate
these motivations, but they too confirm that bad
is stronger than good. Goodhart (1986) had peo-
ple engage in either positive or negative think-
ing prior to an achievement task. These as-
signed thinking strategies involved recalling
oneself being in a situation in which one might
have the assigned series of thoughts, such as
"Deep down I think I'm a pretty competent
person" (positive) or "No matter how hard I try,
I just can't seem to grasp certain things" (neg-
ative). They were then given an anagrams task.
The negative thinking led to better performance
on the test. Obviously, this does not reflect any
direct self-suggestion or self-fulfilling prophecy
(because the results point in the opposite direc-
tion). Goodhart concluded that the negative
thoughts evoked more powerful motivations
than the positive thoughts.
The distinction between self-enhancement
and self-protection has been recast by Higgins
(1987, 1996) as a distinction between preven-
tion and promotion. In Higgins's view, the self
has some goals that involve striving toward
positive ideals and others that involve prevent-
ing the self from misdeeds, which he discusses
in terms of "ought" goals. Direct comparison of
these two was recently undertaken by Shah,
Higgins, Friedman, and Kruglanski (1999).
They found that the positive goals or ideals
were more substitutable than the negative or
ought goals, which is another way of attesting to
the greater importance of the bad. That is, if
people refuse to accept a substitute for a partic-
ular goal, it seems fair to assume that that goal
is more important than another goal for which
they will readily accept an alternative. In the
study by Shah et al., participants performed two
tasks, which were both framed as ideals, both as
oughts, or one of each. When both were framed
as ideals, then success on one reduced effort on
the second, whereas failure on the first led to
increased effort on the second—consistent with
the view that people believed success on one
would substitute for nonsuccess on the other. In
contrast, when both were framed as oughts (or
when they were mixed), there was no evidence
of substitutability, in the sense that there was no
effect for feedback on the first task on effort on
the second.
A conceptual replication of this pattern was
done by Liberman, Chen, and Higgins (1999;
cited by Shah et al., 1999). In that study, par-
ticipants were interrupted and prevented from
completing a first task and later given the op-
portunity to do another task or to resume work
on the same task. When both tasks were framed
as ideals, they were willing to move to the new
task, consistent with a substitutability interpre-
tation. In contrast, when both tasks were oughts,
participants wanted only to resume the old task,
presumably because the new task was not seen
as a substitute. Thus, this line of work suggests
that preventing one bad outcome is not an ade-
quate substitute for preventing another bad out-
come, whereas reaching one good outcome is
often an acceptable substitute for another.
The relative motivational power of good and
bad traits can also be examined in indirect tac-
tics. Indirect tactics of self-enhancement and
protection were studied by Cialdini and his col-
leagues. The best known of these is probably
that of basking in reflected glory (Cialdini et al.,
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1976), by which people link themselves to suc-
cessful others and successful groups. These
studies, however, relied on the procedure of
ascertaining how much students identified with
their university (such as by wearing school col-
ors) following victories versus defeats by the
football team, so it is plausible that the effects
were mainly due to efforts to distance oneself
from the unsuccessful team (rather than linking
oneself to the successful team).
A more rigorous follow-up study was there-
fore done by Cialdini and Richardson (1980),
who explicitly distinguished between "basking
and blasting" (p. 406). In that study, basking
referred to enhancing the positivity of one's
own university, whereas blasting referred to
derogating a rival university, and both tenden-
cies were assessed as responses to personal crit-
icism in the form of failure feedback on a cre-
ativity test. Thus, basking invokes the good,
whereas blasting invokes the bad. Across two
studies, Cialdini and Richardson found the
blasting effect to be consistently stronger, and,
in fact, the basking effect did not reach signif-
icance in either study (unlike the blasting ef-
fect). Thus, the tendency to depict one's rival
university as bad was stronger than the tendency
to describe one's own university as good. The
implication is that the motivation to avoid the
bad is more powerful than the motivation to
embrace the good, which is precisely what one
would expect if bad is stronger than good.
Thus, multiple lines of evidence suggest that
bad is stronger than good with regard to the
self-concept, even though the simple fact of
positively inflated self-appraisals might give the
opposite impression. The positivity of self-con-
cepts reflects the combined motivational effects
of self-protection (avoiding the bad) and self-
enhancement (embracing the good). In many
cases, such as a simple desire to do well, these
two motivations operate in tandem. When they
can effectively be separated, though, the weight
of the evidence suggests that people are more
strongly motivated to avoid bad views of self
than to claim good ones.
Feedback
The relative power of good versus bad feed-
back is yet another sphere in which to test
whether bad is generally stronger than good.
Some researchers have reviewed, as discussed
in preceding sections, work that already points
to bad feedback as more potent. For example,
some of the data on reacting to daily events are
probably mediated by feedback received during
events, and the finding that bad days have more
lasting impact than good days is probably a sign
that bad feedback is stronger. Likewise, the
more widespread use of self-handicapping for
self-protection than self-enhancement (Tice,
1991) suggests that people are more concerned
about avoiding bad feedback than about maxi-
mizing good feedback, which points to a greater
motivational power of bad feedback.
Self-enhancement and self-protective strate-
gies were studied by Agostinelli, Sherman,
Preston, and Chassin (1992). Specifically, these
authors examined whether people would re-
spond to feedback by perceiving failure as rel-
atively common and perceiving success as rel-
atively uncommon. Both distortions benefit the
self, regardless of whether the self succeeds or
fails, because the self s success gains in prestige
by being seen as relatively special; whereas the
self s failure loses its stigma if many other
people fail, too. Participants in their study re-
ceived success, failure, or no feedback about
their performance on a decision-making prob-
lem; they were then given measures of how
other people would likely do. Biases in judg-
ment were stronger following failure than suc-
cess (as compared with the no-feedback con-
trol): After failure, people rated failure as more
common and likely but success as rarer in the
general population. Success, in contrast, yielded
no departures from the control group. Thus,
participants were more affected by bad than
good outcomes, and their responses suggested
stronger motivations to protect the self against
failure than to amplify or enhance the impact of
success.
Students' reactions to feedback from teachers
were studied by Coleman, Jussim, and Abraham
(1987). Bad feedback had a stronger effect on
the students' perceptions of their own perfor-
mance than good feedback. Bad feedback was
also seen as more indicative of the teachers' true
evaluations, although not surprisingly students
regarded the good feedback as more accurate
than the bad.
Reactions to social feedback of acceptance
and rejection were studied by Leary, Tambor,
Terdal, and Downs (1995). Participants were
told that they either had been selected by other
members to be included in a group or excluded
from it or had been randomly assigned to be
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included or excluded. Only the intentional re-
jection led to a change in self-esteem (and a
corresponding change in ratings of other partic-
ipants). Acceptance did not have an effect. In
another study, Leary et al. provided participants
with specific individual feedback indicating that
another person who had listened to their self-
disclosures did or did not (a) like them, (b)
accept them, or (c) desire to meet them. The
rejection feedback resulted in self-esteem scores
that were significantly lower than the individu-
als' own pretest self-esteem, but no feedback
and the positive (acceptance) feedback failed to
produce any significant change in self-esteem.
Thus, bad feedback was clearly stronger be-
cause it alone had a significant effect.
The role of counterfactuals in responding to
borderline feedback was explored by Medvec
and Savitsky (1997). They compared partici-
pants who had just barely made it into a desir-
able grade category (e.g., getting the lowest
possible "A") against those who had just barely
missed it (e.g., getting the highest possible "B").
Satisfaction was high among participants who
had just made the category and low among
those who had just missed it, and the borderline
status enhanced these reactions. Thus, those
who barely missed getting an A were more
distraught and engaged in more counterfactuals
than those who missed getting an A by a wide
margin. For present purposes, the important
finding was that the effects of just missing a
category were stronger than the effects of just
making it. Medvec and Savitsky interpreted this
discrepancy in relation to prospect theory (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979), which holds that
losses have more impact than comparably sized
gains in economic decision making; in other
words, bad is stronger than good.
The picture becomes more complicated with
regard to memory, because the defensive pro-
cesses may succeed in suppressing memory for
unwelcome feedback. Indeed, Kuiper and Derry
(1982) found that participants were less likely to
remember bad than good trait words after they
had merely been asked whether the words de-
scribed them, which shows a memory bias
against unwelcome views of self even when
these were not feedback but merely questions.
(Depressed individuals did not have the same
bias, however.) Hence, findings of selective for-
getting of bad feedback should not be surpris-
ing. Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1976) found
that participants remembered more positive
than negative feedback, overall, although the
effects were strongest when they either ex-
pected success or had had a recent success
experience.
As we noted with self, however, the memory
trace or net result can be biased in favor of
positive feedback, even if bad feedback is stron-
ger, because the bad feedback is processed in a
more biased and hostile fashion. Baumeister
and Cairns (1992) examined how individuals
processed and remembered bad feedback, with
special attention paid to repressors (who are
most likely to show defensive or self-deceptive
responses in the relatively mild context of a
laboratory study). Bad feedback elicited clear
defensive responses during encoding, and these
defenses ranged from avoiding exposure to
elaborating it with refutational thoughts. Re-
pressors recalled the good feedback better than
the bad feedback overall, although a slight re-
versal was found among nonrepressors. In this
study, moreover, feedback was mixed to vary-
ing degrees, so even the good feedback condi-
tion contained some bad feedback, and vice
versa. The highest memory scores in the entire
experiment were obtained among repressors for
the small amount of bad feedback embedded in
the generally good feedback. (The next highest
was nonrepressors in that same condition.) In-
consistency and salience no doubt contributed
to these high memory scores, but inconsistency
and salience should also have operated to im-
prove memory for small bits of praise embed-
ded in the generally bad feedback; there was not
much evidence of this. The explanation is ap-
parently that when feedback is generally good,
people let their defenses down, whereupon any
small bits of criticism emerge as extremely
powerful and are therefore remembered excep-
tionally well. Put another way, bad is clearly
stronger than good when the defenses are down.
Taken together, these studies suggest greater
impact and power for bad than good feedback.
The main limitation is that defensive responses
sometimes succeed in miminizing the long-term
impact of bad feedback. When these defenses
are not operating, however, bad feedback is
stronger than good. Moreover, the greater and
more pervasive efforts to minimize bad feed-
back than to maximize good feedback reflect a
motivational asymmetry that also recognizes
bad feedback as more important than good.
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Health
The importance of physical health makes it a
desirable sphere in which to consider the rela-
tive importance of good versus bad outcomes.
Although we have not found a great deal of
evidence, there are some findings that fit the
idea that bad is stronger than good.
A review of human psychoneuroimmunology
and the biological and environmental factors
suggested that bad events have greater impact
than good ones (Cohen & Herbert, 1996). Nu-
merous studies have reported the deleterious
effects of psychological and physical stress on
immune status. For instance, Glaser, Rice,
Sheridan, Fertel, and Stout (1987) and Kiecolt-
Glaser et al. (1984) have investigated the effects
of medical school examinations as a form of
psychological stress on the immune functioning
of medical school students. Relative to a low-
stress time (e.g., immediately after vacation),
students' immune systems are significantly
compromised by the presence of psychological
stress. Psychological stress results in decreased
activity of the natural killer cells, which protect
the body against disease (Kiecolt-Glaser et al.,
1984). Stress also increases the proliferation of
lymphocyte production (e.g., Glaser et al.,
1987) and heightens the production of herpes
viruses antibodies (e.g., Glaser et al., 1987). The
effects of negative events such as stress on the
body appear to be not only consistent but also
swift. In a study of immune cell levels and
functioning, Herbert, Cohen, Marsland, Bachen,
and Rabin (1994) found weakened immune pa-
rameters as soon as 5 min after the induction of
the stressor.
Given that stressful events happen to every-
one at some point, researchers have sought to
assess whether relaxation techniques would
yield benefits to physiology comparable to the
harm caused by stress. Thus far, the answer
appears to be no. There has only been one study
to assess immune functioning after a stress-
reduction intervention in the presence of a
stressful event (Kiecolt-Glaser, Glaser, Strain,
Stout, & Tarr, 1986). These researchers found
that training medical students in relaxation tech-
niques did not affect the immune changes that
occurred as the result of stressful first-year ex-
ams. Cohen and Herbert (1996) concluded that
there is little evidence for the benefits of stress-
reduction techniques on immunological health.
In other words, bad events impair the body's
protective system, but good events do not
boost it.
A different method of reducing stress is to
increase social support. However, evidence
from controlled studies on the advantageous
effects of social support is also limited. One
study found that residents in a geriatric home
who were visited three times per week by col-
lege students showed no change in cellular im-
mune functioning (Kiecolt-Glaser, Glaser, Wil-
liger, Stout, & Messick, 1985). In another study,
Arnetz, Wasserman, Petrini, Brenner, and Levi
(1987) examined the effect of social support on
lymphocyte proliferation. Swedish women who
had been unemployed for more than 9 months
were given both emotional and informational
support (e.g., giving them information on get-
ting another job). However, this intervention
was not successful in boosting immune
functioning.
In contrast, a lack of social support and lone-
liness have been shown to have a variety of
damaging health consequences. Kiecolt-Glaser
et al. (1984) found that medical students who
reported high levels of loneliness had weaker
immune functioning than students who did not
report high levels of loneliness. Similarly, psy-
chiatric patients who reported high levels of
loneliness also had depressed immune systems.
In summary, various studies and reviews of
the immunology literature indicate that bad is
stronger than good. In particular, researchers
have found that stress and the absence of social
support are reliably associated with immuno-
suppression, whereas their opposites—relax-
ation and increases in social support—do not
seem to have beneficial effects.
Optimism and pessimism were examined by
Schulz, Bookwala, Knapp, Scheier, and Wil-
liamson (1996) in an effort to predict the mor-
tality of cancer patients. Across 8 months, 70 of
the 238 patients in a radiation therapy sample
died. Using Scheier and Carver's (1985) Life
Orientation Test, Schulz et al. assessed both
optimism and pessimism traits. Optimism failed
to predict survival, either alone or in interaction
with age. Pessimism, however, did yield a sig-
nificant prediction of mortality, although only
for the youngest (30-59) age range. (Thus, the
only significant predictor was pessimism inter-
acting with age.) Although the results are cor-
relational, the longitudinal prediction does en-
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hance the plausibility that the trait caused the
survival outcome rather than vice versa. The
implication is that the negative thoughts and
feelings associated with pessimism had a stron-
ger effect on mortality outcomes than the posi-
tive thoughts and feelings that characterize
optimism.
A similar conclusion emerged from a longi-
tudinal study by Robinson-Whelen, Kim, Mac-
Callum, and Kiecolt-Glaser (1997). Pessimism,
not optimism, uniquely predicted psychological
and physical health outcomes, 1 year later.
More precisely, pessimism during Year 3 sig-
nificantly predicted anxiety, stress, and self-
rated health (but not depression) in Year 4. In
contrast, optimism during Year 3 did not make
a significant contribution to predicting any of
the outcomes in Year 4. Although the data are
correlational, the longitudinal design makes it
likely that the causal relationship went from
pessimism to the health outcome rather than the
reverse.
A very different approach has been taken by
Pennebaker and his colleagues (Francis & Pen-
nebaker, 1992; Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Pen-
nebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-
Glaser, & Glaser, 1988) in a program of re-
search on how writing about traumatic personal
experiences can affect subsequent health. In
these studies, participants are typically asked to
write about "the most traumatic experience of
your entire life," whereas control group partic-
ipants write about plans for the day, going to
college, or minor traumas. People who write
about their most traumatic experiences typically
show significant improvements in physical
health, as compared with the control group, on
measures such as visits to the medical centers,
immune system function, and sick days. In an
attempt to see what aspects of stories might
predict (and possibly cause or mediate) these
subsequent improvements, Pennebaker (1993)
subjected the essays from several previous in-
vestigations to linguistic analysis and then
checked these against the data on health out-
comes. Participants whose essays had contained
more words referring to negative, unpleasant
emotions showed significantly greater improve-
ment than those who used fewer such words.
Use of words referring to positive emotions had,
if anything, the opposite effect (and in any case,
the effect for positive emotions was weaker).
Even those participants who showed the biggest
increases in the number of references to positive
emotion across the multiple sessions of the
study (which seemingly should be a sign of
improvement) failed to show a relative im-
provement in health. Pennebaker concluded that
the participants who consistently expressed the
most anxiety, sadness, and other negative feel-
ings were the ones who subsequently showed
the greatest gains in health.
Thus far we have considered health as a de-
pendent variable, but it can also be considered
as an independent variable (although, again,
most work remains correlational). The effects of
health on happiness and subjective well-being
have been studied by several researchers. They
believe health has a large impact on happiness
(e.g., Diener, 1984), but the actual links tend to
be quite weak across the population. One large
and thorough study concluded that health is
irrelevant to happiness, except for older adults
and chronically ill people (Campbell, Converse,
& Rodgers, 1976). The exceptions may help
explain the seemingly mistaken perception that
health is extremely important for happiness.
When health is bad, it does have a major impact
on happiness, but variations in good health have
small or negligible effects. Put another way, the
difference between being moderately sick and
very sick is relatively powerful, whereas the
corresponding difference between being moder-
ately well and very well has little impact, so
health mainly affects happiness when health is
bad. Thus, health too conforms to the pattern in
which bad is stronger than good.
General Discussion
The principle that bad is stronger than good
appears to be consistently supported across a
broad range of psychological phenomena. The
quantity and strength of the evidence were not
consistent and in fact varied widely from one
topic to another. The breadth and convergence
of evidence, however, across different areas
were striking, which forms the most important
evidence. In no area were we able to find a
consistent reversal, such that one could draw a
firm conclusion that good is stronger than bad.
This failure to find any substantial contrary pat-
terns occurred despite our own wishes and ef-
forts. We had hoped to identify several contrary
patterns, which would have permitted us to de-
velop an elaborate, complex, and nuanced the-
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ory about when bad is stronger versus when
good is stronger. The most we can say is that
occasionally other psychological patterns will
override the greater strength of bad things, and
the greater strength of bad varies with respect to
size, amount of evidence, and methodological
strength of evidence. However, the greater
strength of bad was apparent nearly every-
where. Hence, we must conclude that bad is
stronger than good at a pervasive, general level.
Let us briefly summarize the evidence. In
everyday life, bad events have stronger and
more lasting consequences than comparable
good events. Close relationships are more
deeply and conclusively affected by destructive
actions than by constructive ones, by negative
communications than positive ones, and by con-
flict than harmony. Additionally, these effects
extend to marital satisfaction and even to the
relationship's survival (vs. breakup or divorce).
Even outside of close relationships, unfriendly
or conflictual interactions are seen as stronger
and have bigger effects than friendly, harmoni-
ous ones. Bad moods and negative emotions
have stronger effects than good ones on cogni-
tive processing, and the bulk of affect regulation
efforts is directed at escaping from bad moods
(e.g., as opposed to entering or prolonging good
moods). That suggests that people's desire to
get out of a bad mood is stronger than their
desire to get into a good one. The preponder-
ance of words for bad emotions, contrasted with
the greater frequency of good emotions, sug-
gests that bad emotions have more power. Some
patterns of learning suggest that bad things are
more quickly and effectively learned than cor-
responding good things. The lack of a positive
counterpart to the concept of trauma is itself a
sign that single bad events often have effects
that are much more lasting and important than
any results of single good events. Bad parenting
can be stronger than genetic influences; good
parenting is not. Research on social support has
repeatedly found that negative, conflictual be-
haviors in one's social network have stronger
effects than positive, supportive behaviors. Bad
things receive more attention and more thor-
ough cognitive processing than good things.
When people first learn about one another, bad
information has a significantly stronger impact
on the total impression than any comparable
good information. The self appears to be more
strongly motivated to avoid the bad than to
embrace the good. Bad stereotypes and reputa-
tions are easier to acquire, and harder to shed,
than good ones. Bad feedback has stronger ef-
fects than good feedback. Bad health has a
greater impact on happiness than good health,
and health itself is more affected by pessimism
(the presence or absence of a negative outlook)
than optimism (the presence or absence of a
positive outlook).
Convergence is also provided by Rozin and
Royzman (in press). Quite independently of this
project, these authors reviewed the literature on
interactions between good and bad, and they too
concluded that bad things generally prevail. Our
review has emphasized independent, parallel ef-
fects of good and bad factors, whereas theirs
emphasized good and bad factors competing
directly against each other in the same situation
(such as contagion). Both approaches have con-
firmed the greater power of bad factors.
Thus, the greater impact of bad than good is
extremely pervasive. It is found in both cogni-
tion and motivation; in both inner, intrapsychic
processes and in interpersonal ones; in connec-
tion with decisions about the future and to a
limited extent with memories of the past; and in
animal learning, complex human information
processing, and emotional responses.
Searching for Exceptions
Given the scope and variety of the evidence,
the appropriate question to ask is not whether
bad is generally stronger than good but rather,
how general or universal is this pattern? When
we began this review, we anticipated finding
some exceptions that would demarcate the lim-
its of the phenomenon. Although a few isolated
studies have deviated from the general pattern,
we were unable to locate any significant spheres
in which good was consistently stronger than
bad. At most, the greater power of bad can
occasionally be overridden, such as when pos-
itive information is made to be more diagnostic
than negative information (Skowronski & Carls-
ton, 1989, 1992)—but even in this instance, the
greater power of bad than good can be found
lurking in the background (Martijn et al., 1992).
The closest to a general reversal was in an-
ticipation of future events, insofar as prevailing
optimism about the future reflects a greater
power of good future events (e.g., Weinstein,
1980). Even this pattern, however, did not con-
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stitute a reliable exception. When people are
making decisions about specific, impending
events, they seem more motivated to avoid bad
outcomes than to pursue good ones, at least in
many cases in which the magnitude of the two
outcomes has been carefully calibrated to be the
same (as the gambling studies showed).
A related pattern showing a preference for
good is the so-called "pollyanna hypothesis,"
which suggests that people are biased toward
more positive ideas and conclusions. Boucher
and Osgood (1969) observed that "there is a
universal human tendency to use evaluatively
positive (E+) words more frequently . . . than
evaluatively negative words (E-)" (p. 1). Simi-
larly, Matlin and Stang (1978) observed that
negative words consist more often of a positive
root that becomes negative by a prefix (e.g.,
unpleasant) than the reverse. Likewise, when
people are instructed to attribute traits to a target
person, they tend to assign more positive than
negative ones, with approximate proportions of
62% positive and 38% negative (e.g., Adams-
Webber, 1977; Benjafield, 1984; Benjafield &
Adams-Webber, 1976; Tuohy & Stradling,
1987). Still, such findings are not really contrary
evidence, and, in fact, they may help perpetuate
the greater power of bad by keeping it in the
minority so that it remains more salient (e.g.,
Berlyne, 1971). One could also suggest that the
preference for positive words and positive traits
makes the greater power of bad ones especially
remarkable because it must overcome bias. Our
view is simply that the greater frequency of
good is the natural complement to the greater
power of bad: Good can only match or over-
come bad by strength of numbers.
The memory literature also yielded several
findings demonstrating a reversal of the bad is
stronger than good pattern. This reversal ap-
pears to be driven by two distinct processes: a
self-enhancement effect whereby negative memo-
ries were suppressed or positive memories ac-
cessed, and a mood congruency whereby non-
depressed individuals (the majority) showed a
tendency for recalling information that was pos-
itively valenced and thus matched their current
mood. At least in memory, the bad is stronger
than good effect will at times take a back seat to
other psychological principles. Still, the occa-
sional finding of greater recall for positive ex-
periences probably reflects a selective and mo-
tivated process by which bad memories are sup-
pressed, so it does not really indicate that the
bad experiences had lesser power. The very
emergence of processes designed to suppress
unpleasant memories can be regarded as a tes-
timonial to the power of bad experiences.
There was also some evidence that positive
and negative events have differential effects on
memory. Some researchers have found that peo-
ple remember pleasant events better than un-
pleasant events (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Holmes,
1970). However, we found as many or more
studies indicating that negative events leave a
longer and more lasting mark on memory (e.g.,
Banaji & Hardin, 1994; Skowronski & Carl-
ston, 1987; see the Memory section in this arti-
cle). Although our search did yield some mixed
evidence on the effects of bad versus good on
memory, the overall consensus was that, at least
in the short term, bad has a greater impact on
memory (e.g., Bless et al., 1992; Dreben et al.,
1979); with time, it seems that there exist cog-
nitive operations to reduce the longevity of this
effect (e.g., Walker et al., 1997).
There are individual differences in the degree
to which people are oriented toward good ver-
sus bad. Nondepressed people seem to seek out
positive information and avoid negative infor-
mation more than depressed ones, as noted in
several spheres. These include optimism regard-
ing the future (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and
biased recall for positive information (Matt et
al., 1992). There are also repressors who sys-
tematically ignore negative information about
the self (e.g., Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). Like-
wise, there are well-established individual dif-
ferences in general tendencies toward approach
and avoidance motivation (Elliot & Covington,
2001) that may be linked to the relative re-
sponse to bad and good stimuli. These excep-
tions seem, however, to reflect preference for
good over bad rather than subjective impact,
and many of those individuals are actually
strongly affected by bad events when they do
confront them. The individuals for whom good
is actually stronger than bad constitute a small
and atypical minority.
Another factor to consider is the possibility
that overall bad outweighs good (i.e., there is a
main effect for bad vs. good) but that the type of
outcome may moderate the strength of the ef-
fect. That is, if the dependent measures are
broken down into negative (e.g., judging how
clumsy a target is) versus positive (e.g., judging
BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD 357
how graceful a target is), the bad and good will
affect the positive measures, but only the bad
will affect the negative measures. Although nu-
merous studies in this review (e.g., Major et al.,
1997) showed this pattern, it was not consistent
enough for us to pronounce this a true boundary
condition. However, the idea is intriguing and
suggests directions for future research. For in-
stance, in attempts to use a manipulation that
produces the strongest effects, researchers
would be wise to use something bad so as to
influence both positive and negative outcomes.
The general lack of reliable counterexamples
has made it difficult to specify boundary condi-
tions on the general rule that bad is stronger
than good. Indeed, when reviewing the evi-
dence, we had hoped to find more exceptions,
reversals, moderator variables, and boundary
conditions. The presence of these factors would
have made for a more sophisticated and nu-
anced theory as to why bad would be stronger
than good. Accordingly, the lack of these vari-
ables renders it somewhat difficult to formulate
a theory that can account for such broad and
consistent findings. The safest conclusion, then,
is that the bad is stronger than good effect is a
robust and broad-level psychological principle
that underlies a range of psychological phenom-
enon and operates in the company of a limited
number of similarly broad principles.
Revisiting Theory
We began this article by briefly suggesting
that the relative strength of bad over good is an
adaptive response of the human organism to its
physical and social environment. In view of
how pervasive the relative strength of bad is, it
seems unlikely that this pattern is maladaptive.
In particular, we found that bad was stronger
than good with regard to health, social support,
and learning—all of which are important
spheres for adaptations. It seems especially un-
likely that maladaptive patterns would have re-
mained powerful there. We also noted that peo-
ple for whom good is stronger than bad (e.g.,
people insensitive to pain or to guilt) seem
prone to misfortunes and early deaths; this too is
consistent with the view that it is adaptive for
bad events to have greater power. We turn now
to the question of why bad would be stronger
than good across such diverse areas and with
such reliability.
Is it adaptive? At the broadest level, we
argue that bad is stronger than good because
responding to the world in this way is adaptive.
Generally, individuals who are attuned to
preventing and rectifying bad things should
flourish and thrive more than individuals ori-
ented primarily toward maximizing good
things. This argument is admittedly speculative.
The broadest argument we can devise is
based on a change in motivational states in the
presence of negative events, stimuli, and infor-
mation. When considering why bad outweighs
good, an intriguing possibility is that bad things
indicate a need for the self to change something
about itself; that is, that bad things prompt self-
regulation. Through self-regulation, an organ-
ism can adapt and change itself to fit its envi-
ronment, a strategy that is adaptive, given that
the organisms most likely to reproduce are those
that can be flexible in the face of ever-changing
circumstances. Rigid adherence to behavioral
patterns that were useful in the past is not ef-
fective when met with new challenges and
threats. Thus, one of the best methods of in-
creasing survival and gene transmission is to be
closely attuned to the current environmental
contingencies. Moreover, changing the environ-
ment to fit the self is neither effective nor prac-
tical as a route to maximize evolutionary fitness.
A related argument is that progress may be
best facilitated by having bad events have a
lasting impact while good events have a tempo-
rary one. This too is based on the idea that bad
events signal a need for change, whereas good
ones do not. If satisfaction and pleasure were
permanent, there might be little incentive to
continue seeking further benefits or advances.
The ephemeral nature of good feelings may
therefore stimulate progress (which is adaptive).
If bad feelings wore off, however, people might
repeat their mistakes, so genuine progress
would best be served by having the effects of
bad events linger for a relatively long time.
Organisms require not only a system to signal
the need for change, but also one that commu-
nicates quickly and intensely, with little energy
or effort required and without awareness, be-
cause the necessary change may require swift
responding. Empirical findings have demon-
strated that bad things satisfy these criteria. Re-
search confirms that negative stimuli have
greater influence on neural responses than pos-
itive stimuli (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo,
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1998); that negative traits, relative to positive
traits, have greater influence on the overall im-
pression of another person (Peeters & Czapin-
ski, 1990); and that negative trait adjectives
command more attention, at a nonconscious
level, than positive trait adjectives (Pratto &
John, 1991).
In summary, it may be that humans and ani-
mals show heightened awareness of and re-
sponded more quickly to negative information
because it signals a need for change. Hence, the
adaptiveness of self-regulation partly lies in the
organism's ability to detect when response
modifications are necessary and when they are
unnecessary. Moreover, the lessons learned
from bad events should ideally be retained per-
manently so that the same dangers or costs are
not encountered repeatedly. Meanwhile, good
events (such as those that provide a feeling of
satisfaction and contentment) should ideally
wear off so that the organism is motivated to
continue searching for more and better out-
comes. As a result, organisms that possess
mechanisms for adept perception and process-
ing of negative cues will achieve greater fitness
with the environment and, consequently, will
have a greater chance of surviving threats and
more successful reproductive attempts.
A related argument might be made on the
basis of social (and biological) systems. In order
for a system to function effectively, each com-
ponent of the system must do its part. If one
component breaks down, the entire system can
be disrupted. Hence, at the level of the individ-
ual on the system, bad is undeniably stronger
than good. Any individual part can prevent the
system from functioning; but no individual part
can by itself cause the system to succeed. This
is especially true of social groups (or at least
those marked by division of labor): Water must
be found, food must be obtained and distrib-
uted, predators must be kept away, and enemies
must be intimidated or defeated. No one of
those successes can ensure the group's survival,
but failure in any of those spheres can ensure its
demise. Biological systems have similar prop-
erties, and if even one vital organ ceases to
function (heart, lungs, brain, stomach), the per-
son will die. This concept was proposed under
the name of the chain principle by Weinberg
(1975; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). A chain's
efficacy depends on its weakest link, and weak-
ening any one link weakens the entire chain;
whereas strengthening any one link (other than
the weakest) or adding stronger links will have
minimal effect on the chain's overall strength.
A final consideration is that bad has greater
power because good entails consistency across
time and events, which cannot be created by a
single good event but can be destroyed by a
single bad one (see Rozin & Royzman, in
press). The importance of stability with regard
to good things may well have contributed to
evolving a broad orientation to respond more
strongly to bad than good. In a crucial sense, the
stability argument is linked to the asymmetry of
life and death: The individual remains alive
after several years only if he or she managed to
survive every single day, and no degree of op-
timal experience on any given day can offset the
effects of failing to survive on another. Individ-
uals who failed to emphasize the consistency
and stability of good outcomes might well have
taken more extreme risks in pursuit of power-
fully good outcomes and hence failed to survive
and reproduce. In this way, natural selection
would have shaped the human organism to give
high priority to consistency and stability, which
in turn would foster the basic orientation that
bad is stronger than good.
In summary, the propensity to experience bad
as stronger than good may confer a significant
adaptive advantage for individuals, such that
those who mobilized their attention and re-
sources toward the bad would be more likely to
survive and reproduce. To see how life would
be lived if bad were not stronger than good, we
can look to the rare individuals who are born
with a congenital insensitivity to pain. These
individuals do experience pleasurable physical
sensations to a relatively greater extent and in-
tensity than negative ones. Yet they tend to die
from physical mishaps stemming from their in-
ability to feel pain, with children reportedly
biting off their fingers or tongues and suffering
severe burns from contact with hot surfaces and
adults having to find substitute signals for pain.
For example, one sufferer was reported to not
feel a ruptured appendix and therefore failed to
seek treatment in time; another suffered severe
spinal deformations as a result of neglecting
proper posture (Sternbach, 1968). Thus, as hu-
mans, we are well served by having bad stron-
ger than good, on both a personal level and an
evolutionary level.
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Insights from prior theory. Researchers
concerned with impression formation have al-
ready debated some of these theoretical issues
because their area is the main one in which the
predominant strength of the bad side has been
recognized (also known as the positive-nega-
tive asymmetry). Kellermann (1984) examined
the greater power of negativity in initial inter-
actions. She managed to articulate six different
theories: the first three were based on the greater
frequency of good than bad information, which
makes bad information more salient and per-
haps more powerful in other ways. As Keller-
mann noted, however, salience does not really
provide a full and satisfactory explanation, par-
ticularly for laboratory experiments in which
positive information is made equally salient.
One might, however, revive this theory by pro-
posing, at the broadest level, that life as a whole
has more good than bad events, such that bad
events will inevitably stand out (even if on a
local basis, such as in a given laboratory exper-
iment, their frequency is made comparable to
good events). One might even suggest that the
lives of American and Western European citi-
zens (from whom the majority of data are col-
lected) are exceptional in the disproportionately
high frequency of good events, and that if re-
searchers were to study people who live in
harsh, desperate times, individual good events
would be relatively rare and might therefore
have greater power by virtue of this salience.
Another theory was that negative information
is actually more informative, insofar as it de-
parts more from what is normative: People are
supposed to behave well, and so bad acts defy
social and situational pressures and hence are
presumably more revealing about the inner dis-
positions of the actors (and therefore more
likely to promote correspondent inferences; see
Jones & Davis, 1965). Extremity of information
(Fiske, 1980) is also relevant because extremely
positive information can also be quite informa-
tive, so the informativeness hypothesis is a vari-
ation on the correspondent-inference theory.
Kellermann's (1984) review leaned toward fa-
voring the view that bad information is more
informative (based on extremity and distance
from the average or norm). Skowronski and
Carlston (1989) likewise favored the view that
bad events carry more weight in forming im-
pressions because they are more diagnostic of
the traits and dispositions of individuals. Even if
this assessment is correct, however, it is con-
fined to the sphere of forming impressions of
newly met acquaintances, so something addi-
tional would be needed if there is indeed a more
general pattern in which bad is stronger than
good.
Working from a perception background,
Wright (1991) has proposed a "fundamental
negative bias" (p. 471) in which perception will
be guided more by negative than positive
events. She also proposed that this negativity
will carry over into the thoughts and feelings
following the initial perception. Furthermore,
she proposed that these effects are likely to be
strongest to the extent that the stimulus is salient
and the context is vague or sparse. A rich con-
text may mitigate the effect of the stimulus,
whereas salience should enhance it. We note,
however, that if bad is indeed stronger than
good, then it is plausible that a mitigating con-
text might nullify the effects of good, positive
information even more thoroughly than the ef-
fects of bad, negative information. In this sense,
the logic behind Wright's proposition is not
entirely persuasive. Then again, Wright might
simply have meant that the differential impact
of negative information may be clearest when
all effects are strongest, which means in the
absence of mitigating context.
Wright's (1991) account is thus again at best
a partial explanation. If perception has a funda-
mental negative bias, then most other psycho-
logical phenomena will show the same asym-
metry to the extent that they depend on percep-
tion. The perceptual asymmetry, however,
requires explaining itself, so again we are left
searching for a more comprehensive explanation.
The same problem is found in Maslow's
(1968) motivational theories. Although he did
not explicitly speak of the superior power of bad
over good, he did propose that the most basic
and primary motivations involve escaping from
aversive states, such as hunger, deprivation,
cold, and danger. The more positive motiva-
tions of seeking esteem, love, belongingness,
and self-actualization only begin to direct be-
havior when the negative or deficiency (his
term) motives have been satisfied. As with
Wright's (1991) perception-based theory,
Maslow's motivation-based theory can effec-
tively explain why affect, cognition, and behav-
ior give precedence to escaping the bad, insofar
as these responses depend on motivation. How-
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ever, the reason for the motivational asymmetry
is simply postulated rather than explained. In
our view, these patterns point back toward evo-
lutionary selection. We have suggested that sur-
vival and reproduction (in K-selected species)
depend on giving priority to avoiding bad rather
than pursuing good. If this argument is broadly
correct, it would hardly be surprising that the
basic phenomena of perception and motivation
would already show signs of this bias.
A more sophisticated theoretical formulation
by Taylor (1991) is also relevant. Indeed, in her
article, she devoted some space to documenting
the greater power of negative than positive
events. Taylor proposed that aversive events
produce complex cognitive and affective reac-
tions that good, desirable events do not because
the bad events present problems that require
solving. One can thus ignore something good
more easily than something bad. In Taylor's
account, bad events set off two relevant sets of
responses: the first mobilizes resources to meet
the threat, and the second tries to minimize the
damage or trauma afterward. In contrast, pleas-
ant events can be quietly and passively enjoyed
without either the mobilization or the
minimization.
Taylor's (1991) theory addresses a different
problem than the one with which we are con-
cerned. The mobilization and minimization pat-
terns she delineated could be entirely correct
even if good were stronger than bad. The extra
cognitive and affective work involved in re-
sponding to bad events (as opposed to good
ones) would contribute something to the greater
psychological impact of bad events, insofar as
more effort may be required and more extensive
processing may leave clearer psychological
traces (e.g., improving memory). Then again, to
the extent that the minimization process is suc-
cessful, the long-term impact of bad events may
turn out to be less than the impact of good
events: People do not minimize good events, so
these may live on even as the psyche attempts
to purge its memory of prior woes and
misfortunes.
A motivational account of the differential
effects of bad versus good has been proposed by
Cacioppo and colleagues (e.g., Cacioppo &
Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernt-
son, 1997). They proposed a negativity bias in
their model of evaluative space, such that com-
parable degrees of activation have greater ef-
fects on the negative, as opposed to positive,
motivational system. Accordingly, there is a
steeper slope for the relationship between the
activation and motivational response for nega-
tive stimuli. Several investigations have con-
firmed this negativity bias (Bradley, Lang, &
Cuthbert, 1997; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994;
Ito et al., 1998).
In summary, it is apparent that prior work has
contributed an important set of mid-level theo-
ries about the relative power of good versus bad
events. Taken alone, these formulations and in-
sights do not provide a full accounting for why
bad should be stronger than good as a general
psychological principle. The most sophisticated
theories about the asymmetry in impression for-
mation appear to zero in on diagnosticity and
correspondence of inferences, which are spe-
cific to impression formation and could not eas-
ily apply, say, to taste aversion learning or
trauma. We found that bad was stronger than
good in a remarkably broad and diverse set of
phenomena. A specific or mid-level theory may
not be broad enough to account for it. Instead, it
appears to be a basic, pervasive fact of psychol-
ogy that bad is stronger than good.
Implications
The role of culture. Our review focused ex-
clusively on the individual's experience of bad
and good and concluded that experiencing bad
as stronger than good is adaptive to the individ-
ual. In other words, nature may have shaped the
human psyche to treat bad as stronger than
good. Culture, however, would not necessarily
have to conform to this. In fact, if one considers
the myths and ideals that cultures present, there
does not seem to be any clear message that bad
is stronger.
For example, religion is widely regarded as a
supremely cultural phenomenon. In recent mil-
lennia, religious ideas have emphasized salva-
tion as much as retribution (e.g., Eliade, 1982,
1985). Heaven and hell are equally extreme in
the Christian tradition, and there seems little
basis for assuming that hell is in any sense more
powerful or extreme than heaven. Indeed, in
most modern nations, belief in hell is signifi-
cantly less widespread than belief in heaven
(e.g., Aries, 1981), which might be construed as
indicating that the cultural ideas emphasize
good more strongly than bad.
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Love has likewise received idealization in
cultural mythology that has made of it a more
extreme good than is empirically justified.
Songs, films, novels, and wedding vows con-
tinue to promise that love is forever, even
though the statistics on divorce, marriage ther-
apy, and infidelity indicate that it is not. In fact,
Baumeister (1991) concluded that cultural ide-
als of fulfillment have a general pattern of
promising more permanence than is typically
found, whether these fulfillments involve love,
happiness, spiritual enlightenment, fame and
celebrity, wealth, creativity, or others.
Thus, culture certainly presents individuals
with mythical images of extreme possibilities in
both directions. Probably the reason for this is
that these cultural myths are important means
by which a society can motivate its individuals
to behave in socially desirable ways, and miti-
gating the extremity of the myth would simply
weaken the motivations. In particular, culture
may find it optimal to encourage people to delay
gratification over periods that are far longer than
what prevailed in our evolutionary history. As
just one example, the multiyear process of at-
tending college or graduate school is probably
best sustained by a positive image of how won-
derful life will be afterward, whereas nature has
few contingencies that require one to adopt such
a long-range time perspective.
Happiness. We have concluded that bad is
stronger than good, yet a wealth of data suggest
that life is good and people are largely happy
(D. G. Myers, 1992). How can good overcome
the greater power of bad to make life seemingly
so wonderful? There are several answers.
Good can overcome bad by force of numbers.
To maximize the power of good, these numbers
must be increased. This can be done by creating
more goods. For example, in a romantic rela-
tionship each partner can make an effort to be
nice to the other consistently. Such small acts of
kindness are important for combating the bads
that will typically occur. Indeed, if Gottman
(1994) is correct, the ratio should be at least five
goods for every bad. Likewise, individuals can
make an effort to recognize and appreciate the
goods that they have—celebrating each small
success, being thankful for health, and having
gratitude for supportive others.
Another contributor to the perception of life
as good involves selective perception and mem-
ory. As Taylor (1991) argued, the human
psyche has powerful mechanisms for retrospec-
tively minimizing bad experiences. Although
both good and bad feelings may fade with time,
the bad ones are actively suppressed; whereas
the good memories may be cultivated and sus-
tained (e.g., through reminiscence). By the
same token, people may treat bad experiences
as isolated events while integrating good ones
into an ongoing general perception of goodness.
In this way, individuals may sustain a broadly
favorable view of their lives. Something like
this must after all be operating in most mar-
riages, given that most people rate their mar-
riages favorably, but half of marriages end in
divorce. Probably they rate their marriage fa-
vorably (by regarding the problems as tempo-
rary or exceptions) until they begin to contem-
plate divorce seriously.
These considerations are quite consistent
with the view that the good life consists of a
consistent pattern of good outcomes, even if
these are individually relatively small and weak.
A few bad outcomes can be minimized by mak-
ing external attributions or regarding them as
unimportant, thereby preserving the subjective
impression of a stable pattern of good out-
comes. As long as the individual perceives that
pattern of consistent goodness, life may seem
strongly good overall even if nothing strongly
good ever happens.
Learning and child development. We have
also noted that certain areas are characterized by
a belief in the superior power of good. These
areas include learning and child development.
We presented research earlier to suggest that
such beliefs are mistaken. Specifically, punish-
ment produces faster learning than reward, and
bad parenting has a stronger effect than good
parenting. Still, it is possible that some genuine
exceptions can be found in these areas. On the
other hand, it may be that ethical and practical
concerns are mainly responsible for the advo-
cacy of reward instead of punishment. Any
seeming disadvantage of punishment (as com-
pared with reward) in promoting learning may
arise because punishment has side effects that
interfere with effective learning, so punishment
may be quite strong in general. Ethical and
political concerns may make people reluctant to
hit their children, and those individuals who do
hit may sometimes encounter resentments and
other long-term problems, but these concerns do
not prove that punishment is itself weak. In
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other words, punishment may not be optimal for
education, even if it does produce optimal learn-
ing, because the side effects of punishment can
be damaging.
The question about punishment and learning
raises a broader issue. To examine whether re-
ward or punishment promotes better learning is
to look for only one kind of effect—in particu-
lar, a good one (insofar as learning is good). In
a number of the studies we have reviewed here,
researchers found that positive independent
variables affected positive dependent variables,
whereas negative independent variables af-
fected negative dependent variables—although
often the negative independent variables also
affected the positive dependent variables. Put
more simply, good affects good, whereas bad
affects both bad and good. If one were to look
only at good outcomes, however, one might
well often find that good and bad events have
roughly equal impact, and sometimes the good
events will show up as stronger. This would,
however, be a misleading conclusion caused by
the one-sided focus on good outcomes. Only
when the range of outcomes includes both good
and bad ones, such as illness versus health, or a
happy marriage versus a divorce, or liking ver-
sus disliking, can one claim to have provided a
full and balanced assessment of the relative
power of good and bad causes.
Concluding Remarks
In our review, we have found bad to be
stronger than good in a disappointingly relent-
less pattern. We hope that this article may stim-
ulate researchers to search for and identify ex-
ceptions; that is, spheres or circumstances in
which good events outweigh bad ones. Given
the large number of patterns in which bad out-
weighs good, however, any reversals are likely
to remain as mere exceptions. The lack of ex-
ceptions suggests how basic and powerful is the
greater power of bad. In our view, this differ-
ence may be one of the most basic and far-
reaching psychological principles.
Although it may seem pessimistic to con-
clude that bad is stronger than good, we do not
think that such pessimism is warranted. As we
have suggested, there are several reasons to
think that it may be highly adaptive for human
beings to respond more strongly to bad than
good. In the final analysis, then, the greater
power of bad may itself be a good thing. More-
over, good can still triumph in the end by force
of numbers. Even though a bad event may have
a stronger impact than a comparable good
event, many lives can be happy by virtue of
having far more good than bad events.
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